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I. INTRODUCTION
North Carolina, along with twenty-eight other states,' has
adopted a version of the Revised "1962" Uniform Principal and
Income Act,2 codified in Chapter 37 of the North Carolina General
Statutes 3 (referred to hereinafter as the "Act"). While this version
is a substantial adoption of the major provisions of the Revised
1. 7B U.L.A. 150 (1985). Ten other jurisdictions have adopted the 1931 ver-
sion of the UNIFORM PRINCIPALJ AND INCOME ACT. 7B U.L.A. 183 (1985).
2. 7B UL.A. 150 (1985). For discussions of the provisions of the REVISED UNI-
FORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, see 3 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 233 et
seq. (3d ed. 1967); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§
811 et seq. (1981); Bogert, Uniform Principal and Income Act Revised, 101 TR. &
EST. 787 (1962); Barclay, The Principal and Income Act, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV.
489 (1967); Volkmer, Nebraska's Trustees' Powers Act and Principal and Income
Act: The New Look in Nebraska Trust Law, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 121 (1980);
Lacovara, Trust Principal or Income?-Judicial and Legislative History in New
York, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1970); Note, The Revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act-Progress But Not Perfection, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 473 (1963).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 37-16 to -40 (1984).
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Uniform Principal and Income Act, there are numerous variations,
omissions and additional matter, too extensive to be catalogued by
the commissioners in their annotations to the Uniform Law.4 No
attempt will be made here to list and discuss each difference be-
tween the Act and the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act.
Neither the Act nor its predecessor, the North Carolina Uniform
Principal and Income Act adopted in 1937, 5 has been a frequent
subject of litigation in the appellate courts.6 Indeed, the questions
the Act is designed to answer, regarding how a fiduciary allocates
income, expenses and other accruals or depletions when dealing
with the interests of successive beneficiaries, appear rarely to have
troubled North Carolina practitioners. 7
The purpose of the Act is to clarify the duties of a fiduciary in
situations involving the interests of successive beneficiaries. In
many instances, the testator's or settlor's intent will not be clear
from the instrument; in others, he will not have foreseen the
problems his fiduciary will face. Even where the fiduciary has dis-
4. 7B U.L.A. 145, 148 (1985).
5. 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 190, formerly codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 37-1
to -15, repealed, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 729, § 3.
6. The 1937 Act, supra note 5, was mentioned in only three cases: Greer v.
United States, 448 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1971)(see infra text at note 30); Citizen's
Nat'l Bank v. Grandfather Home for Children, Inc., 280 N.C. 354, 185 S.E.2d 836
(1972)(concerning allocation of expenses of proceeding to construe a will); Wells v.
Planters Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 265 N.C. 98, 143 S.E.2d 217 (1965)(apportionment
of administration expenses and rents received). The 1973 Act has been cited only
once, Northwestern Bank v. Robertson, 39 N.C. App. 403, 250 S.E.2d 727
(1979)(judgment directing application of assets which include principal and in-
come must designate the interest to be used in meeting each claim).
7. North Carolina texts discuss the Act only in passing, e.g., 1 N. WIGGINS,
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA § 145 (2d ed. 1983),
and do not explain how it might apply, e.g., R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF
TRUSTS §§ 26, 27 (5th ed. 1976), or that an allocation of income or expenses to
principal or income is required or how to make the allocation, e.g. M. EDWARDS,
NORTH CAROLINA PROBATE HANDBOOK §§ 19-5 (3d ed. 1982); E. QUICK & M. GOLD-
STEIN, NORTH CAROLINA ESTATE ADMINISTRATION MANUAL (N.C. Bar Ass'n 1984); J.
HUGGARD, THE ADMINISTRATION OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA
(1985). The practical aspects of making allocations during the administration of
estates and trusts are beyond the scope of this article.
Neither the Act nor its 1937 predecessor has been mentioned in most of the
relatively few appellate cases in which these statutes could have applied, e.g., In
re Bulis, 240 N.C. 529, 82 S.E.2d 750 (1954); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Grubb, 233 N.C. 22, 62 S.E.2d 719 (1950); Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N.C. 611, 36
S.E.2d 17 (1945); Ingle v. Allen, 71 N.C. App. 20, 321 S.E.2d 588 (1984), rev. de-
nied, 313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d 391 (1985).
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cretion to allocate between principal and income, he may need
guidance. At the common law, a trustee's duty where there are two
or more beneficiaries is to deal impartially with them and where a
trust is created for successive beneficiaries to act toward each of
them with due regard for his respective interests.8 The tension is
between the trustee's duty to make the trust property productive
and his duty to use reasonable care to conserve the corpus; it is the
economic tension between the income beneficiary and the remain-
derman, the ultimate taker at some uncertain future time; it is the
tension between having one's cake and eating it, too.9 The "due
regard" principle furnishes scant guidance for fiduciaries. The Act
is designed to furnish the necessary guidance in a uniform way to
promote as simple and convenient an administration of an estate
or trust as is consistent with fairness to all beneficiaries. The Com-
missioners on Uniform Laws perceived that the practical rules of
8. E.g. Campbell v. Jordan, 274 N.C. 233, 242, 162 S.E.2d 545, 551 (1968);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 232, Comment b (1959), clearly delin-
eates the tension the Act is designed to settle:
b. Duty to each of successive beneficiaries. If by the terms of a trust the
trustee is directed to pay the income to a beneficiary during a designated
period and on the expiration of the period to pay the principal to an-
other beneficiary, the trustee is under a duty to the former beneficiary to
take care not merely to preserve the trust property but to make it pro-
ductive so that a reasonable income will be available for him, and he is
under a duty to the latter beneficiary to take care to preserve the trust
property for him.
Although the trustee is not under a duty to the beneficiary entitled
to the income to endanger the safety of the principal in order to produce
a large income, he is under a duty to him not to sacrifice income for the
purpose of increasing the value of the principal. Thus, the trustee is
under a duty to a life beneficiary not to purchase or retain unproductive
property or property which yields an income substantially lower than
that which is normally earned by trust investments, although it is proba-
ble that the property will appreciate in value. See [RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TRUSTS] § 240.
On the other hand, the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary
who is ultimately entitled to the principal not to purchase or retain prop-
erty which is certain or likely to depreciate in value, although the prop-
erty yields a large income, unless he makes adequate provisions for amor-
tizing the depreciation. See [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS] § 239.
See Kuykendall v. Proctor, 270 N.C. 510, 155 S.E.2d 293 (1967)(action by per-
sonal representative against trustee for decedent for failure to exercise properly
her discretion to provide for decedent's comfort and support where trustee indi-
vidually had a remainder interest in the trust corpus).
[Vol. 8:173
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/2
N.C. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT
the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act were nearer a set-
tlor's probable intent than the impractical guidance of common
law principles, for few settlors would contemplate the extensive
and detailed bookkeeping adjustments required for fairness to suc-
cessive interests. No doubt the draftsmen of the North Carolina
Act were similarly motivated. ' °
Unless the governing instrument makes another provision, the
Act applies to regulate the allocation of income and expense be-
tween the income and principal interests of a trust or estate.' Ac-
cordingly, draftsmen who do not expressly exempt the fiduciary
from the provisions of the Act' 2 or simply give the fiduciary stan-
dard North Carolina powers by incorporating by reference the pro-
visions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32-27's are directing by default that
10. See, A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1937, 15 N.C.L.
REV. 321, 356 (1937).
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-18(a) (1984) provides:
(a) A trust or a decedent's estate shall be administered with due re-
gard to the respective interests of income beneficiaries and remainder-
men. A trust or a decedent's estate is so administered with respect to the
allocation of receipts and expenditures if a receipt is credited or an ex-
penditure is charged to income or principal or partly to each:
(1) In accordance with the terms of the trust instrument or will, not-
withstanding contrary provisions of this Article; or
(2) In the absence of any contrary terms of the trust instrument or
will, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, or
(3) If neither of the preceding rules of administration is applicable,
in accordance with what is reasonable and equitable in view of the inter-
ests of those entitled to income as well as of those entitled to principal,
and in view of the manner in which men of ordinary judgment would act
in the management of their own affairs.
See Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Grandfather Home for Children, Inc., 280 N.C. 354,
185 S.E.2d 836 (1972) (construing similar provision of former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-
2).
12. Sample language may be found in, e.g., R. WILKINS, DRAFTING WILLS AND
TRUST AGREEMENTS-A SYSTEMS APPROACH 13.50W, 13.51W, 13.60W(19)
(1985).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27 (1984) (North Carolina's standard fiduciary pow-
ers). If the draftsman incorporates by reference the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT §
32-27 (1984) or relies on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-13-3 (1984) (estates-powers of
personal representatives) he has directed that the Act apply. The former statute
provides (at (a)(29)), "[w]here not otherwise provided by the Principal and In-
come Act . . . to determine ...[w]hat is principal and what is income . .. ."
The discretion thus allowed is only that under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-18(a)(3)
(1984), that is, in situations where neither the terms of the instrument nor the
Act would apply. Likewise, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-13-3(a)(18) (1984) permits allo-
cation of "items of income or expenses to either estate income or principal, as
1986]
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the provisions of the Act apply to govern the allocation made by
the fiduciary.14 This article will explore some of the consequences
of each choice and will provide a framework for a decision whether
to have selected sections of the Act apply or to draft specific in-
structions or to allow for fiduciary discretion. But first, a discus-
sion of basic predrafting considerations is necessary.
II. BASIC PREDRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING
ALLOCATIONS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND INCOME
A. Scope of Fiduciary's Discretion
A typical will or trust provision designed to avoid application
of the Act and grant the fiduciary discretion might provide:
[The fiduciary shall have power to] determine, irrespective of
statute or rule of law, what shall fairly and equitably be charged
or credited to income and what to principal notwithstanding any
determination by the courts or by any custom or statute, and
whether or not to establish depreciation reserves."
Such discretion may be desirable in order to avoid having one's
silence invoke the automatic effect of the Act 16 in resolution of
conflicting claims between successive interests or to avoid the com-
plexities of drafting directions for the fiduciary designed to cover
all aspects of allocations between principal and income which
might arise. It has been suggested that a discretionary clause may
be used to achieve certain purposes: "to avoid litigation when the
law is not settled; to avoid complexity or injustice when the law is
settled; and to allow the favoring of either the life tenant or the
remainderman.' ' 17 The use of such a provision raises two questions:
permitted or provided by law." The law makes such provisions in Chapter 37 of
the General Statutes-the North Carolina Principal and Income Act of 1973.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(29) as originally enacted granted the fiduciary
power "[t]o determine ... what is principal and what is income of any estate or
trust and to allocate or apportion receipts and expenses as between principal and
income in the exercise of the fiduciary's discretion . . . ." 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws
ch. 628, § 1. The 1967 amendment took away that discretion (effective October 1,
1967) by inserting the language, "where not otherwise provided by the Uniform
Principal and Income Act . . . ." 1967 N.C. Sess Laws ch. 956, § 1. The 1977
amendment changed the reference to the Uniform Act to read, "Principal and
Income Act of 1973." 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 30, § 1.
15. R. WILKINS, supra note 12, at I 13.60W(19).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-18(a)(1) (1984).
17. Note, Discretionary Income and Principal Clauses in Trust Instru-
ments, 50 YALE L.J. 1467 (1941). From the trustee's perspective, there is another
[Vol. 8:173
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first, whether the language is really effective to authorize the trus-
tee to exercise his discretion notwithstanding the Act or other stat-
utes or the common law of the state and, second, if it is effective,
whether that discretion is absolute or does it have boundaries. In
addition, it may be asked whether the fiduciary by exercising such
discretion can by allocation change the tax character of, for exam-
ple, an item that would otherwise be income under the tax laws.
The Act specifically provides for fiduciary discretion:
If the trust instrument or will gives the trustee or personal
representative discretion in crediting a receipt or charging an ex-
penditure to income or principal or partly to each, no inference of
imprudence, partiality or abuse of discretion arises from the fact
that the trustee or personal representative has made an allocation
contrary to a provision of this Article.18
Where a discretionary allocation clause has been used, however,
two contrary views of its construction have arisen, aptly designated
the "narrow view" and the "broad view." ' Courts following the so-
called narrow view hold that the fiduciary's discretion extends only
to situations where there is a genuine question or some honest
doubt under local law as to whether a receipt is principal or in-
come.20 The broader view is that a simple grant of discretion with-
purpose: to protect the trustee from liability for controversial actions involving
principal-income allocations. Subcommittee Report, Trustees' Absolute and Un-
controlled Discretionary Powers; 1965 Paoc. OF THE A.B.A. SEC. OF REAL PROP.
PRO. & TR. L. 185, 190.
On the other hand, some institutional trustees may prefer discretion only in
circumstances not covered by the Act to avoid pressures from beneficiaries who
may importune the trustee to exercise the powers in a manner contrary to the
provisions of the Act. Perhaps this was the impetus for the 1967 amendment to
the Act, supra note 14.
Yet another purpose served by discretionary powers of a fiduciary, which un-
derlies those suggested in the text, is to permit the fiduciary to adjust accounts to
reach expected trust results when other discretionary powers have produced re-
sults inconsistent with the general law of trusts. Sherman v. Sherman, 32 Ohio
Op. 2d 334, 202 N.E.2d 443 (P. Ct. 1962), cited and discussed infra at note 34.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-18(b) (1984). Cf. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Grandfather
Home for Children, Inc., 280 N.C. 354, 362, 185 S.E.2d 836, 841-42 (1972)(con-
struing former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-2).
19. Note, The Discretionary Allocation Clause in a Trust Instru-
ment-Broad or Narrow Construction by Texas Courts?, 21 Sw. L. REV. 824
(1967). The cases are collected in Annot., 27 A.L.R.2D 1353 (1953). See, Note,
Principal and Income: The Discretionary Allocation Clause, 30 BAYLOR L. REV.
343 (1978).
20. E.g., Am. Sec. & Tr. Co. v. Frost, 117 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert.
19861
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out guidelines is sufficient to allow the fiduciary to allocate con-
trary to established law, provided his exercise of discretion is made
in good faith and with reasonable judgment. In assessing such good
faith and reasonable judgment, courts which have used the broader
view in deciding such cases have looked to the settlor's or testator's
intent as revealed in the instrument concerning the need of the life
tenant vis-a-vis the projected benefit to the remaindermen.2 1
Under the Restatement view, the requirement of reasonableness
can be waived by language granting the fiduciary discretion that is
"absolute" or "unlimited" or "uncontrolled. ' 22 But an abuse of dis-
cretion will always be found if the fiduciary acts in bad faith. Pub-
lic policy will not allow a testator or settlor to deprive the court of
all power of control. 3
denied, 312 U.S. 707 (1941); Comm'r v. O'Keeffe, 118 F.2d 639 (1st Cir. 1941). See
In re Heard's Estate, 107 Cal. App. 2d 225, 236 P.2d 810 (1951)(will did not pro-
vide "absolute" discretion as required by statute to foreclose court's supervision).
None of these cases was decided under a version of the UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND
INCOME ACT.
21. Dumaine v. Dumaine, 301 Mass. 214, 16 N.E.2d 625 (1938). Accord, In re
Leibmann's Estate, 131 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1954); In re Warner's Trust, 263 Minn.
449, 117 N.W.2d 224 (1962); In re Bixby's Estate, 55 Cal. 2d 819, 362 P.2d 43, 13
Cal. Rptr. 411 (1961); In re Estate of Gardiner, 5 Ariz. App. 239, 425 P.2d 427
(1967).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, Comment d (1959):
d. Factors in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion. In
determining the question whether the trustee is guilty of an abuse of
discretion in exercising or failing to exercise a power, the following cir-
cumstances may be relevant: (1) terms of the trust; (2) the purposes of
the trust; (3) the nature of the power; (4) the existence or non-existence, •
the definiteness or indefiniteness, of an external standard by which the
reasonableness of the trustee's conduct can be judged; (5) the motives of
the trustee in exercising or refraining from exercising the power; (6) the
existence or nonexistence of an interest in the trustee conflicting with
that of the beneficiaries.
3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, § 187.2 (collecting cases at note 7); Price, Trustees'
Discretionary Powers, 4 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 643 (1969). But see G. BOGERT
& G. BOGERT, supra note 2, § 560 at nn. 9-12.
23. Heyer v. Bullock, 210 N.C. 321, 186 S.E. 356 (1936)(Stacy, C.J.: "[A trus-
tee's discretion] is subject to the control of the court at all times. [citing cases
back to Jordan v. Jordan, 4 N.C. 292 (1816)]"); Stix v. Comm'r, 152 F.2d 562, 563
(2d Cir. 1945) per L. Hand, J.:
Nevertheless, we agree that no language, however strong, will entirely re-
move any power held in trust from the reach of a court of equity. After
allowance has been made for every possible factor which could rationally
enter into the trustee's decision, if it appears that he has utterly disre-
garded the interests of the beneficiary, the court will intervene. Indeed,
[Vol. 8:173
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There is no North Carolina appellate case which directly deals
with the scope of a will or trust provision giving a fiduciary discre-
tion to allocate between principal and income. North Carolina law
is clear, however, that the intent of a testator or settlor, unless un-
lawful, is controlling in construing a will or trust agreement.2 4 It is
also clear that a trustee must deal impartially with the benefi-
ciaries of a trust.2 5 The courts have not hesitated to review the
discretion of trustees in appropriate cases26 and to condemn abuses
of discretion amounting to fraud, bad faith, improper motive, or
arbitrariness. The courts will safeguard and preserve the interests
of beneficiaries.2
Dicta in two North Carolina Supreme Court cases29 suggest
that North Carolina would follow the so-called broad view: a fidu-
ciary who is given discretion to allocate between principal and in-
come may exercise such discretion unless his exercise is arbitrary
or fraudulent, but his discretion is circumscribed by the settlor's
intent as indicated by the instrument as a whole. The Fourth Cir-
cuit, in a well-reasoned opinion,30 has held that North Carolina
were that not true, the power would not be held in trust at all; the lan-
guage would be no more than a precatory admonition.
See 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, § 187.4; G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 2, §
560.
24. Campbell v. Jordan, 274 N.C. 233, 162 S.E.2d 545 (1968).
25. Id.; Kuykendall v. Proctor, 270 N.C. 510, 155 S.E.2d 293 (1967).
26. E.g., Woodard v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 67 S.E.2d 639 (1951); Albright
v. Albright, 91 N.C. 220 (1884).
27. Carter v. Young, 193 N.C. 678, 137 S.E. 875 (1927); Lightner v. Boone,
222 N.C. 205, 22 S.E.2d 426, (1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 561, reh'g denied, 320 U.S. 809
(1943).
28. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Broyhill, 263 N.C. 189, 139 S.E.2d 214 (1964);
First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Rasberry, 226 N.C. 586, 39 S.E.2d 601
(1946)(dictum); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnston, 269 N.C. 701, 153
S.E.2d 449 (1967). See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-47, -52(c) (1984), authorizing the
Attorney General to enforce charitable trusts. See also Sternburger Foundation,
Inc. v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 161 S.E.2d 116 (1968)(common law authority
to enforce charitable trusts).
29. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Grandfather Home for Children, Inc. 280 N.C. 354,
185 S.E.2d 836 (1972)(trial court erred in allocating expenses to principal where
instrument gave fiduciary discretion and there was no finding of an abuse of dis-
cretion); Little v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 252 N.C. 229, 113 S.E.2d 689
(1960)(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 and adding, "of course
the trustee will not be given 'unlimited power to make allocations as between
income and principal in contravention of the intent of the settlor as indicated by
the terms of the trust instrument as a whole.' ").
30. Greer v. United States, 448 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1971)
1986]
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would follow the broader view in such cases, the boundary of dis-
cretion being marked by the intent of the settlor as expressed in
the governing instrument31 in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or
improper motive. 32 Fiduciary discretion in other contexts has been
respected. 33
The discretion to allocate between principal and income
should be broadly construed unless the fiduciary's actions are a
perversion of the purposes contemplated by the settlor as drawn
from the instrument and the relevant circumstances. The fiduci-
ary's exercise of discretion will more likely promote the intent of
the settlor or testator and the welfare of the beneficiaries as a
whole than the rules set down by the Legislature or by specific in-
structions set down by a draftsman at a remote time.3 4 Even "ab-
solute" discretion, however, does not set the fiduciary adrift from
31. "The extent of the discretion lodged in trustees by settlors may be en-
larged by the use of adjectives or phrases such as 'absolute' or 'unconditional.'"
Davidson v. Duke University, 282 N.C. 676, 708, 194 S.E.2d 761, 781 (1973).
32. Courts also look to the financial situation of the present beneficiaries. For
example, if there would be no apparent reason for the fiduciary to invade princi-
pal to support the income beneficiary whose income greatly exceeded her needs,
the fiduciary's good faith and the intent of the settlor may well preclude a discre-
tionary payment of principal. Greer v. United States, 448 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1971).
Compare, e.g., Estate of Mose Sumner v. Comm'r, 59 T.C. 837 (1973), non-acq.,
with Atwell v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 425 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
33. E.g., First National Bank of Catawba County v. Edens, 55 N.C. App. 697,
286 S.E.2d 818 (1982)(refusal of trustee to make discretionary distributions to
incompetent beneficiary); Dillon v. N.C. Nat'l Bank, 6 N.C. App. 584, 170 S.E.2d
571 (1969)(refusal of trustee to make discretionary payment of one-half of debt
secured by entirety property). See generally, Halback, Problems of Discretion in
Discriminatory Trusts, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1961).
34. See, e.g., Sherman v. Sherman, 202 N.E.2d 443, 453 (Ohio P. Ct.), aff'd, 5
Ohio St. 2d 27, 213 N.E.2d 360 (1962):
This Court believes a fourth purpose could be added to the above list
[referring to the three reasons enumerated for trustee discretion, Note,
supra note 17 and accompanying text]. When a settlor has granted the
trustee broad powers which in effect permit the trustee to depart from
many established trust duties, he may insert such a discretionary alloca-
tion clause to permit the trustee to cause ordinary trust results when the
use of their broad powers has created results inconsistent with ordinary
trust results.
In this case the trustee had been allowed to keep a substantial portion of the trust
corpus invested in the stock of one corporation. The growth of that corporation
was undoubtedly due in large part to its retention of earnings, at a cost to the.
income beneficiaries. The trustee's discretion could be exercised to remedy this
imbalance, for example, by allocating stock dividends to income, contrary to the
local law.
[Vol. 8:173
10
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/2
1986] N.C. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT 183
all legal and equitable notions; his discretion is still to be exercised
in a manner contemplated by the settlor or testator as expressed in
the instrument and as appears from the relevant facts and circum-
stances.3" The statute requires that "[a] trust or a decedent's es-
tate shall be administered with due regard to the respective inter-
ests of income beneficiaries and remaindermen. ' ' 36 The sense of the
statute which should govern a fiduciary's discretion is found in the
rule respecting allocations where neither the governing instrument
nor the Act is applicable: in such cases, the allocation shall be
made in accordance with what is reasonable and equitable in view
of the interests of those entitled to income as well as of those enti-
tled to principal, and in view of the manner in which men of ordi-
nary prudence, discretion and judgment would act in the manage-
ment of their own affairs.37
B. Tax Consequences of Fiduciary Discretion
1. Effect of Allocation on Income Taxation
"Income" is defined for purposes of the estate and trust in-
come tax provisions 38 of the Internal Revenue Code as fiduciary
accounting income.39 The Code expressly refers to local law. This
does not mean, however, that state law controls whether receipts
by an estate or trust are subject to federal income taxation-this
35. The very fact that the settlor or testator created the trust, divided
the estate between life tenant and remainderman, and embodied the dis-
cretionary power in the principal and income clause instead of in the
direct disposition provisions shows that he did not intend the principal-
income clause to confer an unlimited power to deviate from local law,
however broad the language employed.
Subcommittee Report, supra note 17, at 191.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-18(a) (1984).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-18(a)(3) (1984). See Hauser, Tax Problems in Prin-
cipal and Income Provisions in Trusts, 1969 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 69.601.
38. Subchapter J of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. §§ 641-668 (1985).
39. I.R.C. § 643(b) (1985) provides:
(b) Income.-For purposes of this subpart and subparts B, C, and D, the
term "income", when not preceded by the words "taxable", "distributa-
ble net", "undistributed net", or "gross", means the amount of income of
the estate or trust for the taxable year determined under the terms of the
governing instrument and applicable local law. Items of gross income
constituting extraordinary dividends or taxable stock dividends which
the fiduciary, acting in good faith, determines to be allocable to corpus
under the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local laws
shall not be considered income.
11
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provision relates to fiduciary accounting for principal and income
which is utilized by the taxing statute to effect a tier structure of
taxable priorities.40 How the fiduciary accounts for and allocates to
principal and income determines how taxes are allocated between
the income interest and the remainder interest. An illustration is
provided in the text, infra at footnote 121.
The Regulations anticipate abuses of fiduciary discretion and
give the Commissioner authority to ignore allocations which "de-
part fundamentally from concepts of local law."'4 1 The purpose of
the Regulations is to prevent attempts by fiduciaries to shift tax
liabilities by making allocations inconsistent with "fundamental"
concepts of state law; the provision would permit the Service to
question such an allocation under the rules of state law governing
allocations. If the governing instrument directs an allocation to be
made, it is doubtful even under the Regulations the Commissioner
could prevail,42 but where the fiduciary acts under a grant of broad
discretion, it is a closer question. 43 Two items, extraordinary divi-
40. See generally, M. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND & R. STEPHENS, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIES 395 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter FER-
GUSON]; A. MICHAELSON & J. BLATTMACHR, INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND
TRUSTS 48 (11th ed. 1980). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-18 (1984) and Chapter 37 of the
North Carolina General Statutes as a whole govern allocations under North Caro-
lina law.
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-i (1986) provides, in part:
Trust provisions which depart fundamentally from concepts of local
law in the determination of what constitutes income are not recognized
for this purpose. For example, if a trust instrument directs that all the
trust income shall be paid to A, but defines ordinary dividends and inter-
est as corpus, the trust will not be considered one which under its gov-
erning instruments is required to distribute all its income currently for
purposes of section 642(b) (relating to the personal exemption) and sec-
tion 651 (relating to "simple" trusts).
Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-2 provides, in part:
Dividends allocated to corpus.-Extraordinary dividends or taxable
stock dividends which the fiduciary, acting in good faith, determines to
be allocable to corpus under the terms of the governing instrument and
applicable local law are not considered "income" for purposes of subpart
A, B, C, or D, part I, subchapter J, chapter 1 of the Code.
These regulations have been criticized as an unwarranted attempt to impose a
"federal concept of 'income'" on a fiduciary acting under specific directions in
computing fiduciary accounting income when that question is, under the statute,
left to local law. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 400-01.
42. See Bisbee v. Fahs, 80 F. Supp. 929 (D. Fla. 1948)(allowing capital losses
to be charged to income under will provision).
43. Compare Doty v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1945)(beneficiary taxed
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dends and taxable stock dividends, are inexplicably a proper sub-
ject for the exercise of a fiduciary's good faith discretionary alloca-
tion to principal unless the governing instrument or local law
clearly requires allocation to income. Certainly these are not the
only items subject to a fiduciary's discretion." For tax purposes,
any good faith exercise of discretion by the fiduciary, if allowable
by state law, will be accepted by the Service, but an allocation
clearly contrary to concepts discussed in the previous section of
this article45 will not be allowed.
2. Estate Tax Implications of Discretion in Irrevocable
Trusts
Powers of management and administration reserved to the set-
tlor of an irrevocable inter vivos trust may attract the estate tax
through I.R.C. § 2036"' and § 2038'1 if those powers are tanta-
mount to the power to designate the persons who will possess or
enjoy the property or the income therefrom.4 The State Street
Trust Company case 4 9 caused considerable consternation"0 in this
on ordinary dividends allocated to principal by fiduciary under dicretionary allo-
cation power), with Thornton v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 1177 (1945) (fiduciary exercised
"sound discretion" allocating part of long term capital loss to income, thereby
reducing income tax of income beneficiary) and Comm'r v. Wade, 155 F.2d 918
(2d Cir. 1946).
44. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 405; See J. PERSCHEL & E. SPURGEON, FED-
ERAL TAXATION OF TRUSTS, GRANTORS AND BENEFICIARIES §§ 3.02[A], [B] (1978).
45. See text accompanying notes 29-37, supra.
46. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) (1985). The number of other trustees who must join in
the exercise of that power is immaterial. Treas. Reg. §§ 20-2036-1(a)(ii), (b)(3)(i)
(1986).
47. I.R.C. § 2038 (1985).
48. See H. WEINSTOCK, PLANNING AN ESTATE: A GUIDEBOOK OF PRINCIPLES AND
TECHNIQUES § 8.37 (2d ed. 1982).
49. State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959). The
grantor as co-trustee had retained powers to exchange trust property for other
property, to invest in assets ordinarily not considered suitable for a trust invest-
ment and to make discretionary allocations between principal and income. Even
though "[p]erhaps no single power ... would be enough to warrant inclusion of
the corpus of the trust in his estate . . .the powers conferred on the trustees,
considered as a whole, are so broad and all inclusive that within any limits a
Massachusetts court of equity could rationally impose, the trustees, within the
scope of their discretionary powers, could very substantially shift the economic
benefits of the trust between the life tenants and the remaindermen." Id. at 639.
Citing and quoting from Dumaine v. Dumaine, 301 Mass. 214, 16 N.E.2d 625
(1938)(supra note 21-a "broad view" case) the court noted that "short of utter
13
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area, holding that certain discretionary administrative powers re-
tained by the grantor as co-trustee caused property transferred to
be included in his estate. State Street was, however, effectively
overruled by Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States51 and there
now seems to be little question that "no aggregation of purely ad-
ministrative powers can meet the government's amorphous test of
'sufficient dominion and control' so as to be equated with owner-
ship. ' 52 It is essential to note that the holdings in the cases follow-
ing the Old Colony rationale are founded on state law which would
require the settlor or trustee to treat all interests fairly, reasonably
and in good faith.5 3
Particularly until that rule is finally settled by North Carolina
appellate courts and the holding of Old Colony is adopted in the
Fourth Circuit,5" a conservative approach is to provide that fiduci-
ary discretion respecting allocations between principal and income
be exercised only by a co-trustee other than the settlor. At least it
should be made clear in the trust instrument, if the settlor-trustee
is to have such power, that his discretion is not absolute but is
subject to standards of reasonableness and good faith.55
3. Gift Tax Implications of Discretion in Trusts
The federal gift tax law provides for a $10,000 annual exclu-
disregard of the rights of a life tenant or a remainderman springing from 'arbi-
trary or dishonest conduct or bad faith, or fraud' . . . a Massachusetts court
would have no external standard with which to measure the trustee's conduct."
The sword of discretion can cut two ways.
50. Report of the Subcommittee of Estate and Tax Planning, Tax Problems
of Administrative Powers in Trusts, 3 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 305 (1968).
51. 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
52. Id. Accord, Estate of Ford v. Comm'r, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), non-acq., aff'd
per curiam, 450 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1971); Estate of Pardee v. Comm'r, 49 T.C. 140
(1967), acq.; Budd v. Comm'r, 49 T.C. 468 (1968); Estate of Graham v. Comm'r,
46 T.C. 415 (1966); Estate of King v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 973 (1962), non-acq.
53. See C. LoWNDEs, R. KRAMER & J. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES 157-58, 226-27 (3d ed. 1974). Cf. Greer v. United States, 448 F.2d 937 (4th
Cir. 1971).
54. Cf. Greer, 448 F.2d 937 (indicating approval of Old Colony holding).
55. See Hauser, supra note 37, 1 69.602. For an argument against the pre-
sumption that purely administrative powers do not run afoul of I.R.C. § 2036
(1985) and suggesting that the settlor-trustee's actions during life be reviewed at
death under the I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) (1985) standard, see Dodge, Retentions, Re-
ceipts, Transfers, and Accumulations of Income and Income Rights: Rumina-
tions on the Post-Byrum Role of Estate Tax Sections 2036, 2037, 2039 and
2043(a), 58 TEx. L. REV. 1, 28-31 (1979).
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sion in I.R.C. § 2503(b), 5 provided two requirements are satisfied.
First, the gift must not be a gift of a future interest" and second,
the gift must have an ascertainable value." It could be argued that
broad trustee powers, including discretion or certain directions
with regard to allocations between principal and income, render an
income interest incapable of valuation. This is the IRS position.59
In Revenue Ruling 77-358,61 the trustee was required to allocate
between principal and income in accordance with state law, pro-
vided that gains and losses on the sale of trust assets were to be
charged to income and in selecting assets for reinvestment, only
assets yielding a current return would be acquired. Because the in-
come of the trust would be diverted to offset any losses incurred in
the sale of trust assets, the income required to be distributed could
not be accurately determined and so the value of that interest was
held to be unascertainable. This view has received some judicial
support."
56. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1985).
57. The statute provides that gifts of future interests do not qualify for the
annual exclusion. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (1986) defines the term: "'Future
interest' is a legal term and includes reversions, remainders, and other interests or
estates, whether vested or contingent, and whether or not supported by a particu-
lar interest or estate, which are limited to commence in use, possession or enjoy-
ment at some future date or time." An income interest, of course, qualifies as a
present interest. Rev. Rul. 58-242, 1958-1 C.B. 251.
58. The "ascertainable value" requirement is judicially imposed. Comm'r v.
Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945). Compare, e.g., Rosen v. Comm'r, 397 F.2d 245 (4th
Cir. 1968) with Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United States, 609 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir.
1979).
59. Rev. Rul. 77-358, 1977-2 C.B. 342.
60. Id.
61. E.g., Van Den Wymelenberg v. United States, 397 F.2d 443 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 953 (1968); Fischer v. Comm'r, 288 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1961).
But see, e.g., Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States, 311 F. Supp.
670 (D. Md. 1970). In the first two cases cited, the trustee had broad powers of
sale and exchange and investment. In addition, the trustees in the Fischer case
had the power to make improvements on the substantial rental property held by
them, and the cost of the improvements could, the court thought, leave nothing
for the beneficiaries when added to mortgage payments required to be made.
There was no discussion in Van Den Wymelenberg or Fischer of the equitable
restraints state law would impose on the trustees. Those equitable restraints and
that the instrument "specifically dictated that 'the welfare of such beneficiary
shall be the primary concern of the trustee'" dictated a different result in Mer-
cantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. The result in Greer v. United States, 448 F.2d
937 (4th Cir. 1971)(ascertainable value of a charitable remainder prior to 1969
amendment of I.R.C. § 2055(e)) is based on a similar analysis of North Carolina
19861
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Other courts, however, have been more receptive to taxpayers'
arguments.6 2 In each of these cases, the court has noted that, while
the allocation power might be a legal right to effect an indirect
diversion of income to the remaindermen, state law would circum-
scribe the conduct of the trustee to keep his actions within the
bounds of reasonableness, particularly where the settlor's intent to
benefit the income interest was apparent from the four corners of
the instrument. Greer v. United States63 indicates this view would
probably prevail were the question raised by a North Carolina tax-
payer. The same rationale should usually apply to defeat an argu-
ment by the IRS" that a gift is incomplete because of broad pow-
ers to allocate between principal and income retained by the
settlor-trustee.65
4. Grantor Trust Rules-Implications of Discretionary
Allocations
The grantor trust rules"6 provide that "[a] power to allocate
receipts and disbursements as between corpus and income, even
though expressed in broad language 61 7 does not cause the grantor
to be treated as owner, regardless of who holds such power. The
words "broad language" and the absence of a requirement that this
power be exercised by one in a fiduciary capacity suggests the con-
clusion that an absolute discretion in the grantor is permitted. The
Senate Finance Committee Report's indicates, however, that the
law and the instrument involved. Cases concerning the ascertainable value of
charitable remainders prior to the 1969 amendment of I.R.C. § 2055(e) are col-
lected in Annot., 46 A.L.R. FED. 246, § 2 (1980) and may be helpful in an analysis
of I.R.C. § 2503(b) questions.
62. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 670
(D. Md. 1970); Martinez v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 60 (1976), acq.; Quatman v. Comm'r,
54 T.C. 339 (1970); Pettus v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 112 (1970); Brown v. Comm'r, 30
T.C. 831 (1958), acq.; Swetland v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 249 (1978).
63. 448 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1971).
64. See Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-2(c), (d) (1986).
65. See Robinson v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 346 (1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 774 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982).
66. I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1985).
67. I.R.C. § 674(b)(8) (1985). See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.674(a)-l(b)(1)(iv),
1.674(b)-l(b)(8) (1986).
68. Senate Report No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. at 369 (1954) says, in part:
This exception is designed to insure that a power which is normally
vested in the trustee for purposes of conforming appropriate trust ac-
counting principles may not, if vested in the grantor as trustee, be con-
188 [Vol. 8:173
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same sort of standards discussed earlier in this article 9 apply here
as well. Accordingly, when the grantor is to be trustee, or if he is
not to be trustee but more than half of the trustees are "related or
subordinate parties who are subservient to [his] wishes, '70 the
grant of discretion to allocate between principal and income should
be limited by a standard of fiduciary good faith and reasonableness
so that the power is clearly not within the grantor trust rules.71
C. Beneficiary as Trustee
If a trustee is also a beneficiary of the trust, his powers may be
of such significance as to require the corpus of the trust to be in-
cluded in his estate under I.R.C. § 2041.72 The Regulations pro-
vide, however, with respect to administrative powers:
[t]he mere power of management, investment, custody of as-
sets, or the power to allocate receipts and disbursements as be-
tween income and principal, exercised in a fiduciary capacity,
where the holder has no power to enlarge or shift any of the bene-
ficial interest therein except as an incidental consequence of the
discharge of such fiduciary duties is not a power of
appointment.73
Under North Carolina law, a trustee-beneficiary will not be al-
lowed to exercise administrative powers relating to discretionary
allocations of principal and income. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32-34(a)74
provides:
... [A] power conferred upon a person in his capacity as fiduci-
ary to make discretionary distributions of principal or income to
himself or to make discretionary allocations in his own favor of
receipts or expenses as between income and principal cannot be
exercised by him. If the power is conferred on two or more fiduci-
strued as a power to determine the beneficial enjoyment of income or
corpus.
69. See text accompanying notes 29-37, supra.
70. I.R.C. § 674(c) (1985).
71. Hauser, supra note 37, at 69.603; Zaritsky, Grantor Trusts §§ 671-79,
TAX MGMT. (BNA) 452, at A-19 (1983).
72. I.R.C. § 2041 (1985).
73. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-1(b)(1); 25-2514-1(b)(1) (1986). Cf. Katz v. United
States, 382 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1967).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-34(a) (1984). This restriction does not apply to
trusts created before July 1, 1975, in which the grantor is serving as trustee or to
trusts created thereafter in which the grantor serves as trustee if the instrument
shows a clear intent that the statute not apply. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-34(b) (1984).
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aries, it may be exercised by the fiduciaries who are not so
disqualified.
Consequently, if a beneficiary is to be trustee, even if another trus-
tee or co-trustee has discretion as to distributions, the beneficiary-
trustee should not be given discretion to make allocations between
principal and income.7' Appropriate limiting language might
provide:
. . .If my wife is a beneficiary and also serves as co-trustee of any
trust under the provisions of this will or any codicil thereto, she
shall have no such discretionary power as co-trustee regarding
discretionary allocations as between principal and income as pro-
vided in the preceding paragraphs, and all such powers shall, be
exercised by the other co-trustee.
D. Marital Deduction
To qualify for the marital deduction, trusts must provide that
the spouse is entitled to all of the income for life.76 Administrative
powers which would allow the trustee to shift income away from
the donee or surviving spouse might jeopardize the trust's qualifi-
cation for the marital deduction.7 7 But if the power to allocate be-
75. See generally, Moore, Caution: Boilerplate May Be Hazardous to Your
Client's Health, 1980 INST. ON EST.. PLAN. 501.4c.
76. Power of Appointment Marital Deduction Testamentary Trust: I.R.C. §
2056(b)(5) (1985); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(a)(1) (1986). Qualified terminable
interest property testamentary trust: I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I) (1985); Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(c) (1986); Power of Appointment marital deduction in-
ter vivos trust: I.R.C. § 2523(e) (1985); Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(e)-1(f) (1986). Quali-
fied terminable interest property inter vivos trust: I.R.C. § 2523(f)(2)(B) (1985),
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(f)-1(c) (1986).
77. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(1) (1986):
[Tihe effect of the trust [must be] to give [the surviving spouse] substan-
tially that degree of beneficial enjoyment of the trust property during her
life which the principles of the law of trusts accord to a person who'is
unqualifiedly designated as the life beneficiary of a trust. Such degree of
enjoyment is given only if it was the decedent's intention, as manifested
by the terms of the trust instrument and the surrounding circumstances,
that the trust should produce for the surviving spouse during her life
such an income . . .as is consistent with the value of the trust corpus
and with its preservation.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(e)-1(f)(1) (1986) has identical language. See Prop. Treas.
Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-7(c) and 25-2523(f)-1(c) (1986). The regulations specifically
provide that state law (i.e., law discussed in text accompanying notes 29-37,
supra) "shall be taken into account in determining whether or not [the above
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tween income and principal, construed in light of state law, the
provisions of the instrument as a whole and the surrounding cir-
cumstances, is subject to a standard of reasonableness, the interest
is not disqualified. 78
Revenue Ruling 69-5679 promulgates rules that govern the ex-
tent to which fiduciaries may have the power to allocate income
and expenses between principal and income and to provide or not
to provide for depreciation reserves without causing the loss or
diminution of the marital deduction where the surviving or donee
conditions] are satisfied." Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-5(e), 25.2523(e)-1(3) (1986);
Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-7(d), 25.2523(f)-l(e) (1986).
78. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(3) (1986) provides:
In the case of a trust, the rules to be applied by the trustee in alloca-
tion of receipts and expenses between income and corpus must be con-
sidered in relation to the nature and expected productivity of the assets
passing in trust, the nature and frequency of occurrence of the expected
receipts, and any provisions as to change in the form of investments. If it
is evident from the nature of the trust assets and the rules provided for
management of the trust that the allocation to income of such receipts as
rents, ordinary cash dividends, and interest will give to the spouse the
substantial enjoyment during life required by the statute, provisions that
such receipts as stock dividends and proceeds from the conversion of the
trust assets shall be treated as corpus will not disqualify the interest as
passing in trust. Similarly, provision for a depletion charge against in-
come in the case of trust assets which are subject to depletion will not
disqualify the interest passing in trust, unless the effect is to deprive the
spouse of the requisite beneficial enjoyment. The same principle is appli-
cable in cases of depreciation, trustees commissions, and other charges.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056()-5(f)(4) (1986) provides, in part:
(4) Provisions granting administrative powers to the trustee will not have
the effect of disqualifying an interest passing in trust unless the grant of
powers evidences the intention to deprive the surviving spouse of the
beneficial enjoyment required by the statute. Such an intention will not
be considered to exist if the entire terms of the instrument are such that
the local courts will impose reasonable limitations upon the exercise of
the powers. Among the powers which if subject to reasonable limitations
will not disqualify the interest passing in trust are the power to deter-
mine the allocation or apportionment of receipts and disbursements be-
tween income and corpus . ...
The same provisions are found in the gift tax regulations, Treas. Reg. §§
25.2523(e)-l(f)(3), (4) (1986). See Rev. Rul. 66-39, 1966-1 C.B. 223. Cf. Estate of
Stewart v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 830 (1969), rev'd, 436 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir.) cert. denied,
404 U.S. 828 (1971); Gardiner v. United States, 69-2 U.S.T.C. 12628 (D. Ariz.
1969), rev'd, 458 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1972); Greer v. United States, 448 F.2d 937
(4th Cir. 1971).
79. Rev. Rul. 69-56, 1969-1 C.B. 224.
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spouse has a life estate or an income interest with a power of ap-
pointment. The provisions of this Revenue Ruling should extend
to testamentary and inter vivos qualified terminable interest prop-
erty trusts."0 The rules generally provide that if state law or the
governing instrument (1) prevents the fiduciary from favoring
other beneficiaries over the spouse, (2) gives the spouse enforceable
rights in the trust, and (3) limits the fiduciary from making alloca-
tions that, based on the composition of the assets, would deprive
the spouse of enjoyment, these powers are permissible. In Example
Two of the Ruling the fiduciary has discretion to allocate between
principal and income; in Example Three state law regarding alloca-
tions controls. Both examples are held to qualify under the marital
deduction regulations, but the holding with respect to Example
Two is based on the assumption that state law would require ad-
herence to principles such as those outlined in Section 187 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts.81 There is no North Carolina case
which directly involves the scope of a fiduciary's discretion to allo-
cation between principal and income, but it seems clear that this
state's law is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Revenue Rul-
ing 69-56.82
The question of allocating income accrued but unpaid at the
death of the beneficiary of a qualified terminable interest property
trust bears brief mention. Must this income be allocated to the
spouse's estate (allocated to income) or can it be allocated to the
remaindermen (allocated to principal)? The statute provides that
the spouse must be "entitled to all the income from the prop-
erty" 83 for life. 8' The Committee Reports indicate such income
must be allocated to the spouse's estate. 5
80. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-7(c)(1), 25.2523(f)-1(c)(1) (1986).
81. See text accompanying notes 29-37, supra; Rev. Rul. 66-39, 1966-1 C.B.
223.
82. See text accompanying notes 29-37, supra. There are apparently no cases
wherein the qualification of the marital deduction is challenged because of a trus-
tee's discretion to allocate between principal and income.
83. I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I), 2523(f)(3) (1985).
84. I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(II), 2523(f)(2)(B) (1985).
85. "A qualifying income interest for life in any property must provide the
spouse with a degree of beneficial enjoyment sufficient to satisfy the rules applica-
ble to marital deduction trusts under Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)." JOINT COM-
MITTEE EXPLANATION OF THE UNLIMITED MARITAL DEDUCTION-JOINT COMMITTEE
ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIc RECOVERY TAX ACT OF
1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1981). Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(8) (1986) pro-
vides, "as regards the income from the period between the last distribution date
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The Act allocates such income to the estate of the spouse"' but
if the instrument gives the trustee discretion, he could allocate
these receipts to corpus, thereby passing that amount to the re-
maindermen rather than to the spouse's estate. Accordingly, the
following language should be included in instruments in which the
trustee has discretion to allocate between principal and income:
[A]ny accrued and undistributed income at the death of settlor's
wife shall be paid to her executors and administrators . 7
Failure to do so, however, should not be fatal. The IRS has indi-
cated that even a direction in the instrument that such income be
distributed to the remainder beneficiary is not violative of the
qualified terminable interest property provisions. 8
III. How THE ACT APPLIES AND WHEN DISCRETIONARY
ALLOCATIONS ARE RECOMMENDED
A. When the Right to Income Arises for an Income Beneficiary
The Act provides:
An income beneficiary is entitled to income for the period
beginning on the date specified in the trust instrument or will, or,
if no date is specified, on the date an asset becomes subject to the
trust or on the date [day] after the date of the decedent's death
and ending on the date the income interest of the beneficiary ter-
minates. In the case of an asset becoming subject to a trust by
reason of a will, it becomes subject to the trust as of the date of
the death of the testator even though there is an intervening pe-
riod of administration of the testator's estate.89
and the date of the spouse's death, it is sufficient if that income is subject to the
spouse's power to appoint."
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-20(c) (1984). See In re Estate of Bulis, 240 N.C. 529,
82 S.E.2d 750 (1954).
87. R. WILKINS, supra note 12, at 11 19.10, 19.10W (1985). But see WACHOVIA
WILL AND TRUST MANUAL 14 n.2 (1985): "An income interest will constitute quali-
fied terminable interest property even if income between the last distribution
date and the date of the spouse's death is not required to be distributed to the
spouse or the spouse's estate."
88. L.T.R. 3403102, October 21, 1983. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-7(c)
and 25-2523(f)-1(c) (1986) provide that it is not a requirement for qualification
that the income between the last distribution date and the death date be distrib-
uted to the spouse's estate. See L.T.R. 8429057, April 18, 1984.
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-20(a) (1984). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-19 (1984) defines
income and principal, largely by reference to later sections in the Act.
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This provision is in accord with the common law of North Car-
olina.90 If an item-a receipt-is allocated by the fiduciary to in-
come, the income beneficiary under a will is entitled to such in-
come from the day following the date of decedent's death; the
same rule holds if the asset producing the income is subject to a
trust, unless the instrument specifies otherwise. This provision is
not subject to fiduciary discretion91 unless the fiduciary has ex-
press discretion to distribute income to one beneficiary rather than
to another. The only device for circumventing this section, other
than a specific provision in the will or trust instrument, is for the
fiduciary in the exercise of his discretion to allocate the receipt to
principal so that it would not accrue to the income beneficiary at
all. Accordingly, a fiduciary must give close consideration not only
to who is entitled to income but also to who bears the burden of
tax on that income.
For an income beneficiary under a will, the income accrues
from the date following the date of the testator's death, unless the
will makes a different provision. A similar rule applies for the in-
come beneficiary of a testamentary trust: if the will leaves Black-
acre to T in trust for A to receive the income, A's income interest
accrues as of the date of the testator's death. It might be asked
whether the estate or the beneficiary (including the trust if the de-
vise were in trust) is taxed on such income. Either the executor or
the Service might assert that such income is really income taxable
to the beneficiary (or to the testamentary trust).
Consider first the income beneficiary under a will.92 The
scheme of Subchapter J of the Internal Revenue Code is to tax
with income the one entitled to it or the one who receives it.93 In
90. Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N.C. 611, 36 S.E.2d 17 (1945). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 234 (1959).
91. The discretion contemplated in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-18(b) (1984) is only
the discretion to "[credit] a receipt or [charge] an expenditure to income or prin-
cipal or partly to each. . . ." If, to use the case covered in the second sentence of
§ 37-20(a), an asset becomes subject to a trust by reason of a will,.a fiduciary with
plenary powers to allocate between principal and income would have no authority
once he had allocated an item to income to hold it for the corpus of the trust if
the income beneficiary were entitled to distribution of the income under the
instrument.
92. This discussion assumes a general direction in the will to distribute in-
come currently.
93. See generally FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 407-20. Generally speaking, an
estate or trust is taxed on its income in much the same manner as an individual,
but is allowed to deduct amounts of income required to be distributed or actually
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this regard, § 662(a)(1)94 provides that a beneficiary shall include
in gross income "[t]he amount of income for the taxable year re-
quired to be distributed currently . . . , whether distributed or not
... .The test of taxability to the beneficiary is not receipt of in-
come, but the present right to receive it."'9 5 Whether income is cur-
rently distributable depends on the provisions of the instrument
and state law.9 The ultimate right to receive income is not a pre-
sent right to compel its distribution. 7 Income on assets devised
and bequeathed to the executor, currently payable to a beneficiary,
can be reallocated from the estate to the beneficiary if not actually
paid, but this result may be unlikely because state law constraints
on the executor probably deny the beneficiary's right to current
distribution."
If the testator makes a general or specific devise99 to a trust, a
similar question"0 arises with respect to the income earned by the
distributed to beneficiaries in a tax year. I.R.C. §§ 661, 651 (1985). The benefi-
ciaries entitled to receive or actually receiving such income distributions are taxed
thereon. I.R.C. §§ 662, 652 (1985).
94. I.R.C. § 662(a)(1) (1985).
95. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
96. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.651(a)-2(a), 1.661(a)-2(c) (1986).
97. Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 168 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1948), aff'g First Nat'l
Bank of Memphis v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 1428 (1946); and In re Smith's Estate v.
Henshi, 64 F. Supp. 196 (D.C. Tenn. 1946).
98. It may be questioned whether a will's command to distribute income of
an estate currently is in all cases effective under North Carolina law. All real and
personal property in the estate is available for payment of claims, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28A-16-1 (1984), and the executor can, if necessary, petition the court to have
realty, not devised to him as executor, sold, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-17-1 (1984), or
leased or mortgaged, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-17-11 (1984). Only after payment of
claims and administration expenses is he to distribute assets, N.C. GEN. STAT. §
28A-22-1 (1984). He has nothing to give away until then, and is personally at risk
if he does so. Allen v. Currie, 254 N.C. 636, 119 S.E.2d 917 (1961); Mallard v.
Patterson, 108 N.C. 255, 13 S.E. 93 (1891). See Ervin v. Clayton, 278 N.C. 219,
179 S.E.2d 353 (1971); In re Estate of Bost, 211 N.C. 440, 190 S.E. 756 (1937);
Rev. Stat. § 3713(h) [31 U.S.C. § 192 (1983)]; Rev. Rul. 66-43, 1966-1 C.B. 291.
Before that time, the executor cannot be required to make distribution. Security
Nat'l Bank v. Bridgers, 207 N.C. 91, 176 S.E. 295 (1934). See generally, FERGU-
SON, supra note 40, at 408-13.
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-15-2(b) (1984) provides that title to realty passes
to the devisee as of the time of death. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-39 (1984).
100. The concern here is not with income from property which was left to the
executor as to which he has title under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-15-2(a) (1984).
Rather, the issue here is whether the executor might be taxed on income from
realty devised to a simple trust.
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asset during administration and before formal funding of the
trust,101 assuming the trust is a simple trust required to distribute
its income currently. 102 The question in this instance is whether
income which is "subject to a trust"'0 3 can be taxed to the trust (or
passed through to the beneficiary) if the trust has not been estab-
lished and funded. The general rule is that a testamentary trust is
treated as a separate taxable entity when it comes into existence
under state law and is funded.0 4 Under North Carolina law, a trus-
tee derives his title from the instrument which names him and his
legal existence is derived from that instrument, not from the admi-
nicular proceedings relating to qualification, posting bond, etc., 10 5
as is now required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 36A-107.' 06 A devisee of
realty is entitled to receive the rents to the exclusion of the execu-
tor and a tenant cannot pay the executor.10 7 Accordingly, if the
devise is to a simple trust, the beneficiary of the trust, not the es-
tate, is taxable on the income.1°8
101. Cf. Estate of Bryan v. Comm'r, 22 T.C.M. 864 (1963), aff'd, 364 F.2d 751
(4th Cir. 1966)(I.R.S. argued that assets were distributed to trustee under residu-
ary provision of will and consequently the income beneficiary of the trust was
taxable).
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-i (1986).
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-20(a) (1984).
104. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1986).
105. Lentz v. Lentz, 5 N.C. App. 309, 168 S.E.2d 437 (1969)(upholding con-
veyance of an option by a testamentary trustee who had not qualified). See Ladies
Benevolent Society v. Orrell, 195 N.C. 405, 142 S.E. 493 (1928)("trustee's assent is
not necessary to the validity of a trust ... and his acceptance is presumed until
he declines). Cf. Fulk & Needham, Inc. v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 39
(M.D.N.C. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 1403 (4th Cir. 1969).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-107 (1984).
107. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Frazelle, 226 N.C. 724, 40 S.E.2d 367
(1946). Accord, In re Estate of Galloway, 229 N.C. 547, 50 S.E.2d 563, (1948). Cf.
Rev. Rule 75-61, 1975-1 C.B. 180 (trustee responsibility for filing fiduciary
return).
108. See Hibernia Nat'l Bank in New Orleans v. Donnelly, 121 F. Supp. 179
(E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 214 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1954)(under Louisiana law,
legatees of stock were entitled to possession from date of death and so were taxed
on dividends thereon, rather than the estate); Weber v. Comm'r, 111 F.2d 766 (2d
Cir. 1940)(capital gain on sale of land taxable to beneficiaries); Rev. Rul. 59-375,
1959-2 C.B. 161 (where real property under state law passes directly to heirs, gain
realized on sale of real property to pay estate debts is apportioned between the
estate and heirs in proportion to proceeds received by each). See generally FER-
GUSON, supra note 40, at 407-26; A. MICHAELSON & J. BLATTMACHR, supra note 40,
at 10. But cf., Cohen v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 784 (1947); Rev. Rul. 62-116, 1962-2 C.B.
207; Rev. Rul. 57-133, 1957-1 C.B. 200. Where the estate is amply solvent, the
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B. Apportionment of Rent and Interest Accruals and Recurring
Charges
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-20(b)10 9 provides that receipts due but
not paid at death are principal and that periodic payments are ap-
portioned, the part accruing prior to death to principal and the
balance to income. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-20(c) ° makes a similar
allocation upon termination of an income interest." ' N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 37-39112 apportions recurring charges in the same fashion.
objection that the executor might reach the rents, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28A-15-1, -
17-11 (1984), or the realty itself, §§ 28A-15-1, -17-1 (1984), should more clearly
not apply. See Proctor v. White, 28 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1939);-Harman v.
Comm'r, 4 T.C. 335 (1944).
The example posed should be distinguished from a devise to a residuary
trust. Because a residuary trust is generally considered to come into existence
when the estate is terminated, Bruner v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 1051 (1944); Neuman v.
Comm'r, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 724 (1969), or when it is deemed to have been termi-
nated under Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1986), Chick v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 1414
(1946), aff'd, 166 F.2d 337 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 845 (1948), attempts to
reallocate income to a residuary beneficiary have been unsuccessful. United States
v. Britten, 161 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1947); Titusville Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 3 B.T.A.
868 (1926). See generally, 6 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 36.44
(1983).
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-20(b) (1984).
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-20(c) (1984).
111. The statutes provide:
(b) In the administration of a decedent's estate or when an asset becomes
subject to a trust by reason of a will:
(1) Receipts due but not paid at the date of death are principal; and
(2) Receipts in the form of periodic payments (other than corporate
distributions to stockholders and receipts incident to the operation of a
trade or business), including rent, interest or annuities, not due at the
date of death shall be treated as accruing day to day. That portion of any
receipt accruing on or before the date of death is principal, and the bal-
ance is income.
(c) On termination of an' income interest, the income beneficiary whose
interest is terminated, or his estate, is entitled to:
(1) Income undistributed on the date of termination;
(2) Income due but not paid to the trustee or personal representative
on the date of termination; and
(3) Income in the form of periodic payments (other than corporate
distributions to stockholders and receipts incident to the operation of a
trade or business), including rent, interest, or annuities, not due on the
date of termination, accrued, on a day-to-day basis, on or before the date
of termination.
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-39 (1984). This section provides:
Recurring charges; apportionment: Regularly recurring charges payable
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Accordingly, for example, if the Act applies and the decedent dies
between annual rental payments on a commercial building, the
rent and expense attributable to the asset through the date of
death are allocable to principal; rent and expense attributable to
the asset after the date of death are allocable to income.
At the common law when the landlord dies between rent days
there is no apportionment-the rents follow the reversion. The
rule as to interest is otherwise, and interest is apportioned. 1" The
common law has been changed in North Carolina, not only by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 37-20,114 but also by § 42-6,115 which requires appor-
tionment of "rents, rent charges, annuities, pensions, dividends, or
any other payment of any description, . . . made payable at fixed
periods to successive owners under any instrument or by will. .. "
and by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-7,111 which provides for apportionment
of farm rents upon the death of the lessor and allows the tenant to
continue in possession to the end of the current year. But whether
the Act applies to allocate post-death receipts, part of which ac-
crued before death, between the personal representative (principal)
and the devisee (income) or whether under a discretionary power
from income shall be apportioned to the same extent and in the same
manner that income is apportioned under G.S. 37-20.
113. Wells v. Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 265 N.C 98, 105, 143 S.E.2d
217, 222 (1965).
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-20(b) (1984). This statute changes the common law
of this state as enunciated in, e.g., First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Frazelle,
226 N.C. 724, 40 S.E.2d 367 (1946). The common law rule is that rents follow the
reversion: where A devises his personalty to B and Blackacre, rented to T and in
T's possession as lessee, to C, and the rent on Blackacre falls due after A's death,
C, not B, is entitled to all the rent, none of it being apportioned to B as person-
alty owned by A on the day of his death. Wells v. Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 265 N.C. 98, 143 S.E.2d 217 (1965). The applicable provisions of the North
Carolina Uniform Principal and Income Act, formerly codified as N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 37-4 (construed with former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-2)(repealed 1973)) did not
change this rule; that statute applied only to successive ownership under a trust.
Wells, 265 N.C. 98, 143 S.E.2d 217 (1965). But N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-20(b) (1984)
expressly applies to interests passing through a decedent's estate.
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-6 (1984).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-7 (1984). This is in lieu of implements. 1 S.
MORDECAI, LAW LECTURES 505-07, 532 (1916). See King v. Foscue, 91 N.C. 116
(1884).
In this connection, it should be noted that in 25 counties, agricultural leases
and cropshare contracts run from December 1 to December 1, rather than for the
calendar year. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-23 (1984). Cropshare arrangements are "peri-
odic payments" and must be apportioned. Wells v. Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co.,'265 N.C. 98, 143 S.E.2d 217 (1965).
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such receipts are allocated to principal or to income, the income
character of such items for tax purposes is not changed.
Rents received after death are income in respect of a decedent
to the extent allocable to the period prior to death" 7 and the bal-
ance is ordinary income to the recipient." 8 Interest rules are the
same."'9 An allocation by the fiduciary of pre-death rents or inter-
est to income,"10 contrary to the Act, does not change the taxable
status of the item for the estate or trust, but that allocation and
the operation of the distributable net income [DNI] rules do di-
rectly determine who receives the item and who pays the income
tax on such receipt. An example is helpful:
SITUATION ONE: Decedent dies August 1 entitled to an interest
payment of $12,000 falling due December 31. Under the Act, the
executor allocates the pre-death portion to principal. Assume there
is no other income for the period and only a $400 administration
expense. Assume further that all income must be distributed cur-
rently to the surviving spouse.
SITUATION Two: Same facts as Situation One, except that the
executor, exercising his discretion, allocates the entire interest re-
ceipt and the administration expense to income.' 2 '
117. Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2 C.B. 173. Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Mathis,
61-2 U.S.T.C. 1 9744 (E.D. Ark. 1961).
Note that the cited ruling deals with cropshares, the amount of which may
not be determinable until well after death. Even though no amount could be ac-
crued at death for income tax purposes by an accrual basis taxpayer, yet a propor-
tionate part of the rent ultimately received is income in respect of a decedent.
Estate of Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
939 (1961). See generally FERGUSON, supra note 40, at 194-202; Miller, Income in
Respect of A Decedent-General, TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 32-2d, at A-28-29
(1981).
118. I.R.C. §§ 61, 102(b) (1985).
119. Rev. Rul. 58-435, 1958-2 C.B. 370. Note that, e.g., series E bond interest
earned during decedent's life is taxable as income in respect of a decedent unless
reported earlier by the decedent, Rev. Rul. 64-104, 1964-1 (part 1) C.B. 223, al-
though the personal representative can report all accrued interest on the dece-
dent's final return, Rev. Rul. 68-145, 1968-1 C.B. 203; Rev. Rul. 79-409, 1979-2
C.B. 208, or either the estate or the distributee may elect to accrue the unrealized
interest upon receipt and thereafter report interest increments currently. I.R.C. §
454 (1985).
120. Cf. Seawell v. Cheshire, 241 N.C. 629, 638, 86 S.E.2d 256, 262 (1955),
refusing to surcharge the trustee after the death of the income beneficiary for
allocating all administration expenses to income.
121. This allocation would, of course, have to be within the bounds of the
fiduciary's discretion, discussed in text accompanying notes 29-37, supra.
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Situation One
FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTING INCOME (FAI)
[I.R.C. § 643(b); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32-20(b)]
Interest $ 5,000
Legal fee [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-
21(a)(1)]
Total FAI
TAX COMPUTATION
Estate
Gross Income [I.R.C. §§ 61, 641]
Interest (portion IRD)
Tentative Taxable Income (TTI)
I.R.C. § 642(b) exemption
I.R.C. § 212 expense
TTI
Distributable Net Income (DNI)
I.R.C. § 643(a)(2)
[add back exemption]
DNI
I.R.C. § 661 Distribution
Deduction
FAI [I.R.C. § 661(a)]
or
DNI [I.R.C. § 661(c)]
I.R.C. § 661 Deduction
[lesser of above 2 amounts]
TAXABLE INCOME
Tentative Taxable Income
I.R.C. § 661 Deduction
Taxable Income of Estate
Beneficiary [I.R.C. § 662(c)]
FAI
or
DNI
Beneficiary's income
[lesser of above 2 amounts]
Beneficiary receives all FAI,
net of expense allocable
to income
0
$ 5,000
Situation One
$ 12,000
(600)
(400)
$ 11,000
600
$ 11,600
5,000
or
11,600
$ 5,000
Situation One
11,000
5,000
$ 6,000
$ 5,000
or
11,600
5,000
5,000
Situation Two
$ 12,000
(400)
$ 11,600
Situation Two
$ 12,000
(600)
(400)
$ 11,000
600
$ 11,600
11,600
or
11,600
$ 11,600
Situation Two
11,000
11,600
$ 0
$ 11,600
or
11,600
11,600
11,600
The income beneficiary has clearly been preferred in Situation
Two-the surviving spouse has received $6,600 more than he
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would have received under the Act. Indeed, had the executor not
exercised his discretion in Situation Two to allocate the adminis-
tration expense contrary to the Act, the spouse could have received
$7,000 which would otherwise have belonged to the principal bene-
ficiaries of the estate. Note in both situations that the entire re-
ceipt is taxed, a portion as income in respect of a decedent, but
that the discretionary allocation has allowed the fiduciary to prefer
the income beneficiary. Without such discretion, the fiduciary
could not prefer the income beneficiary, even to the extent of the
administration expense. Granting such discretion is clearly recom-
mended unless there are good reasons against it, especially where
all beneficiaries of the estate are members of the same immediate
family.
C. Income Earned and Expenses Incurred During Administra-
tion of a Decedent's Estate
Section 37-21(a) of the General Statutes1 2 2 seems misplaced in
Chapter 37 in that it does not deal with income, but rather speci-
fies that certain expenses incurred in connection with "the admin-
istration and settlement of a decedent's estate" are to be charged
to principal unless otherwise directed in the will. This provision
applies to an estate even though no trust is involved. Unless the
will or a court otherwise directs, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-21(b) 12 3 pro-
vides for net income on property passing to specific legatees and
devisees to be paid to them and the balance of the estate income to
other takers (except legatees of pecuniary bequests not in trust) in
proportion to their interests computed at the times of distribution
on the basis of "inventory value.' 2 4 In determining what is income
the "rules applicable to a trustee under this chapter" are to be fol-
lowed. After having ascertained what is income for administrative
purposes, the personal representative must then determine the ap-
propriate taker of that income, a substantive law question in that
its answer affects the amount of property received by beneficiaries
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(a) (1984).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(b) (1984).
124. "Inventory value" is defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-17(a)(2) (1984):
The cost of property purchased by the trustee and the market value of
other property at the time it becomes subject to the trust, but in the case
of a testamentary trust, the trustee may use any value finally determined
for the purposes of an estate or inheritance tax.
Cf. Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N.C. 611, 36 S.E.2d 17 (1945)(question of time of valu-
ation of assets subject to trust annuity payment).
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or heirs. Where the surviving spouse is not entitled to all estate
income, this statute has implications which can affect the qualifica-
tion of a bequest or devise for the marital deduction.
In considering the qualification for the marital deduction,
these rules of state law, regarding income and interest on bequests
and devises and allocation of expenses, are the focus of concern:
RULE 1: Administration expenses, including death taxes are
charged to the principal of the estate unless the will directs
otherwise. 12 5
RULE 2: Income on specific devises and bequests is payable to
the devisee or legatee (less expenses attributable to the property,
excluding taxes charged to principal).'2 6 If the devise or bequest is
in trust, the income beneficiary of the trust is entitled to such net
income.12 7
RULE 3: Residuary devisees and legatees are entitled to the
balance of the net income earned during the administration in pro-
portion to their interests in the undistributed assets of the estate
computed at inventory value at the time of distribution. 28
RULE 4: No interest is payable on a pecuniary bequest not in
trust until one year after decedent's death.129 No interest is paya-
ble when the bequest is directed to be satisfied at a future time.130
RULE 5: A pecuniary bequest in trust, however, which directs
that income be paid to a beneficiary for a designated period enti-
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(a) (1984).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(b)(1) (1984).
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(c) (1984).
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(b) (1984).
129. This rule applies to general legacies, Swann v. Swann, 58 N.C. 297
(1860) and to demonstrative legacies, Shepard v. Bryan, 195 N.C. 822, 143 S.E.
835 (1928). Accord, Hart v. Williams, 77 N.C. 426 (1877); Moore v. Pullen, 116
N.C. 284, 21 S.E. 195 (1895); Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Whitfield, 238 N.C.
69, 76 S.E.2d 334 (1953). Where the bequest is for support, it bears interest from
death, McWilliams v. Falcon, 59 N.C. 235 (1861). See generally, 6 W. BOWE & D.
PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 59.11 (1960); 1 N. WIGGINS, supra note 7, at
§ 145; Graves & Shepherd, Two Problems in Estate Administration in Virginia:
Disposition of Income and Payment of Interest on Legacies, 15 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 198 (1958).
There is apparently no case law or statute in North Carolina regarding the
rate of interest to be charged. If the will contains no provision regulating the rate
of interest, the general rule is that the usual legal rate is allowed, unless there is a
controlling statute. 6 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra, § 59.12.
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(b)(2) (1984) (parenthetical language); Heyer v.
Bulluck, 210 N.C. 321, 186 S.E. 356 (1936); Croom v. Whitfield, 45 N.C. 143
(1853).
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tles that beneficiary to the income from the date of death."'
RULE 6: Income from property used to discharge pecuniary
legacies and to satisfy debts and administration expenses is paya-
ble to residuary legatees.' 32 If the residuary is in trust, such income
is treated as income of the trust.'33
If the Act applies and there is no contrary testamentary provi-
sion (except that no death taxes are to be paid from the marital
share' 3 4-to get around Rule 1) the effects of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-
21'- 5 and the rules discussed are:
(a) Outright pecuniary marital deduction bequests: Not enti-
tled to any income and entitled to interest only from one year after
decedent's death. Accordingly, the value of the marital deduction
might be diminished pursuant to Treas. Reg. 20.2056(b)-4(a). 36 To
circumvent this problem, Covey suggests the following language:
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(b)(2) (1984); Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N.C. 611,
36 S.E.2d 17 (1945). As to North Carolina common law requiring frequent pay-
ments, see Albright v. Albright, 91 N.C. 220 (1884); Heyer, 210 N.C. 321, 186 S.E.
356 (1936).
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(b) (1984). This statute continues the rule which
was a part of the common law of this state. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones,
210 N.C. 339, 186 S.E. 335 (1936). See Annot., 2 A.L.R.3D 1061 (1965).
Other rules of state law which may have an impact in this area include the
following:
In the absence of a testamentary provision to the contrary, the federal estate
tax falls on the residuary. Rule 1, supra at text accompanying note 125; Craig v.
Craig, 232 N.C. 729, 62 S.E.2d 336 (1950)(except in the case of a dissent by a
surviving spouse where the decedent was not survived by a parent or by descend-
ants, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(a) (1984)). North Carolina inheritance tax is charged
against the one who inherits the property. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-15 (1985).
Debts and administration expenses fall on all of the assets of the estate, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-15-1 (1984), and abatement follows the order set out in N.C.
GEN. STAT..§ 28A-15-5 (1984), falling first on the residuary.
Real property does not belong to the personal representative, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28A-15-2(b) (1984), and he is not therefore entitled to the rents, Fleming v.
Chunn, 57 N.C. 422 (1859), although he may petition to have rents applied to
amounts owed by the estate, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-15-11 (1984); Commercial
Nat'l Bank v. Misenheimer, 211 N.C. 519, 191 S.E. 14 (1937); Shell v. West, 130
N.C. 171, 41 S.E. 65 (1902). On the other hand, the personal representative holds
title to personal property in the estate, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-15-2 (1984), and
must account for all of the income therefrom, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-13-10(a)
(1984).
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(c) (1984).
134. See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-4(c) (1986).
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21 (1984).
136. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a) (1986).
1986] 203
31
Narron: Estate Planning Considerations for the North Carolina Principal a
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
So long as any part of said sum shall remain unpaid, my said wife
shall be entitled to receive from my executor such part of the in-
come of my estate as will equal six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of my death upon such unpaid part; provided, however,
that if my executor shall determine that my said wife, but for the
foregoing provision, be entitled to receive as income or interest a
greater amount, my executor shall pay such greater amount to my
said wife. I direct that any income taxes paid by my executor in
respect of the income attributable to said sum shall be charged to
and deducted from the amount payable under this paragraph in
such equitable manner as my executor shall determine. 137
(b) Pecuniary marital deduction trust which entitles the sur-
viving spouse to income: There should be no reduction in the value
of the marital deduction; the surviving spouse is entitled to the
income attributable to the trust from the date of decedent's death
under Rule 5.
(c) Outright residuary marital deduction: The residuary is re-
sponsible for debts and claims under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-15-5"3 s
so the marital share will be net of these deductible expenses.139
The residuary is entitled to estate income not attributable to pre-
residuary bequests (Rules 3 and 6) so there should be no reduction
in the valuation of the marital deduction on account of nonentitle-
ment to income.
(d) Residuary marital deduction in trust: Same as (c), above.
The spouse is entitled, as income beneficiary of the trust, to all of
the estate's income attributable to the residuary, so the qualifica-
tion for the marital deduction should not be affected.
(e) Pecuniary formula bequest: Should be governed by the
same rules as other pecuniary bequests as set out in paragraphs (a)
and (b), above.
(f) Fractional share bequests: These bequests are generally a
part of the residuary estate and so should attract a proportionate
part of the estate's income attributable to the residuary and the
qualification for the marital deduction would not be jeopardized.
From the preceding discussion, it appears that the income al-
location rules would affect the qualification for the marital deduc-
137. R. COVEY, MARITAL DEDUCTION AND CREDIT SHELTER DISPOSITIONS AND
THE USE OF FORMULA PROVISIONS 74 (1985). If the surviving spouse is to receive
income only on the marital share, the draftsman should include a provision to
insure that income will be paid on outright pecuniary marital deduction bequests.
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-15-5 (1984).
139. H. WEINSTOCK, supra note 48, at § 15.21(d).
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tion only if an outright pecuniary bequest, including a formula be-
quest, is used. In those cases, language providing for estate income
to the surviving spouse is necessary to avoid the possibility of a
reduction in the value of the marital deduction.'40 As discussed
earlier in this article, fiduciary discretion regarding allocations be-
tween principal and income should not affect qualification for the
marital deduction.
14 1
D. Allocation of Income Among Beneficiaries
If the surviving spouse is not required to receive all of the es-
tate's net income and the will makes no other provision respecting
payment of the estate's net income, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-21(b) 42
determines ownership of that income and directs distribution, gen-
erally according to the rules discussed in the previous section of
this article.143 The provision also covers income allocation in intes-
tate estates. Net income on specific devises and bequests is allo-
cated to those takers" 4 and the balance of the estate's net income
is allocated to other legatees and devisees (except to legatees of
pecuniary bequests in trust, who are allocated income under Rule
514). How that balance of the estate's net income is to be divided
among the beneficiaries can present perplexing problems for the
fiduciary.
If the allocation is to be made pro rata to a pre-residuary pe-
cuniary bequest, the proportionate relationship of that bequest to
the balance of the estate will change as taxes and debts and ad-
ministration expenses are paid from the residuary and as values of
assets fluctuate. ' 6 The time at which the fiduciary is to determine
140. These problems are discussed at length in Report of the Committee on
Probate and Estate Administration, 102 TR. & EST. 916 (1963), and R. COVEY,
supra note 137, at 60-85.
141. See text accompanying notes 76-82, supra.
142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(b) (1984). This statute is identical in all mate-
rial respects to § 5(d) of the REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, 7B
U.L.A. 160-61 (1985).
143. See text accompanying notes 125-133, supra.
144. See Rule 2, supra note 126.
145. See Rule 5, supra note 131.
146. The same problem arises with fractional share residuary bequests and
also in intestate estates where there are non-pro rata distributions to beneficiaries
in anticipation of the final distribution. For a suggested solution during adminis-
tration, see Dole, A Technique for Making Distributions From Principal and In-
come to Residuary Beneficiaries During Administration of Estates- With Appli-
cation to Trusts, 79 HARV. L. REV. 765 (1966).
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the proportions which will control the allocation is therefore of
first importance. Is he to make further determinations as values of
assets change and how does he account for income received before
payment of large claims but disbursed after such payment, when
the residuary share has been diminished? Consider this example:
Assume an estate, after administration of expenses and
debts, of $1,000,000, bequeathed one-half outright to the widow
and one-half outright to the other individuals. Assume further
that estate taxes aggregating $250,000 are paid, charged solely
against the half of the estate bequeathed to the other individuals.
Of $750,000 remaining in the possession of the executor, the
widow is still entitled to $500,000, which is now 2/3 of the undis-
tributed assets.
Assume further that the estate earns income at a steady 4%
rate throughout the administration. Before the estate taxes are
paid, the estate will yield $40,000 annually, which will be distrib-
utable $20,000 to the widow and $20,000 to the other benefi-
ciaries. After the taxes are paid, however, the $750,000 remaining
will earn only $30,000 annually, 2/3 of which will be produced by
the widow's $500,000 interest. At this point the executor is faced
with a dilemma: should he continue to distribute half of the in-
come to the widow and half to the other residuary legatees, or
should he give the widow 2/3 and the other residuary legatees only
1/3? However he decides to allocate income, there is a strong
chance that his decision will result in controversy.14
The Act, at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-21(b)(2), 14 8 is designed to re-
solve this controversy, but it does not solve all problems of alloca-
tion. The legatees in the example posed would receive the estate's
net income "in proportion to their respective interests in the un-
distributed assets of the estate computed at times of distribution
on the basis of inventory value."149 Suppose in the example the
executor did not distribute any income until immediately after the
estate's death tax liability were satisfied, say nine months from the
date of death. In that nine-month period, the $1,000,000 estate has
earned $30,000. After the check is written for the tax liability, the
"time of distribution," the interests are 2/3-1/3. Is the widow now
147. Distribution of Estate Income During Administration, Report of the
Committee on Probate and Estate Administration, PROC. OF THE PROB. AND TR.
LAW DIVISIONS, SEC. OF REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. LAW OF THE A.B.A., reprinted at
101 TR. & EST. 916, 922 (1963).
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(b)(2) (1984).
149. Id.
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entitled to $20,000 when, if distribution had occurred the previous
day, she would have been entitled to only $15,000? The Statute
may appear to give her the larger amount if the word "distribu-
tion" means distribution of income. That construction is not war-
ranted, however, in light of the statute's design to require a change
in income shares as changes in estate asset shares occur. "Distribu-
tion" as used in the Statute should refer to times of distribution of
assets which result in a change in shares. 5 '
"Inventory value" is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-
17(a)(2).' 51 The definition is designed for trustees, not executors.
What "inventory value" as defined means in connection with N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 37-21(b)(2)' 52 is not entirely clear. It has been sug-
gested that "inventory value" for purposes of the latter section
should be interpreted as federal estate tax values rather than date
of death values where different results would be produced.' 53 The
North Carolina Statute is not, however, subject to that interpreta-
tion because the Act contains a provision not found in the Revised
150. See Estate of Palitz, 331 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1972)(fractional share marital
deduction will); Estate of Greenfield, 484 Pa. 141, 398 A.2d 983 (1979)(fractional
share interests created by widow's dissent). The same problem arises in intestate
estates where advance payments or distributions are made in unequal portions to
some heirs but not to others. See generally Polasky, Marital Deduction Formula
Clauses in Estate Planning-Estate and Income Tax Considerations, 63 MICH. L.
REV. 809, 844-52 (1965); Shaiman, The Widow's Election-Tax and Fiduciary
Considerations, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 9-12 (1966).
Note that the statute is effective "[u]nless the will otherwise provides, or the
court otherwise directs." If there is not a provision in the will providing other
direction, the door is open for an action by the beneficiaries (in the example)
other than the spouse to compel, in advance, an accounting for income based on
changing fractions of estate corpus.
Administration of large estates involving fractional shares can be an account-
ing nightmare. Usually the fiduciary will attempt to make equal distributions to
maintain parity among the shares. Income tax consequences may effectively
thwart this plan where distributions are sought to be made to a surviving spouse
to maintain that share's relationship to the non-marital share at the time death
taxes are paid. Harkness v. United States, 469 F.2d 310 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973).
151. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-17(a)(2) (1984) (quoted supra note 124).
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(b)(2) (1984).
153. R. COVEY, supra note 137, at 63. His suggestion is apparently based at
least in part on the provision of the New York analogue of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-
21(b)(2) (1984) which, unlike its North Carolina counterpart, provides that after
payment of estate and inheritance taxes the proportions of the beneficiaries are
computed based on the fair market value of assets immediately after such
payment.
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Uniform Principal and Income Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-17(a)(6)
provides that: "'[t]rusts include, where applicable, a decedent's es-
tate whether testate or intestate." Substituting the word "estate"
for "trusts" in the definition of "inventory value" 154 would define
that term as "the market value of other property at the time it
became subject to the estate."
A second problem suggested by Covey is the lack of clarity of
the words "in proportion to their respective interests in the undis-
tributed assets of the estate. Are funds held for the payment of
administration expenses and death taxes considered a part of the
'undistributed assets' in making the income allocation and, if so,
does the income beneficiary of the funds from which these pay-
ments are made have an 'interest' in such assets?"'16 5 He suggests
that the most equitable and practical approach "would be to con-
sider administration expenses and death taxes chargeable to the
residuary estate as being part of the estate until paid, since the
estate will be receiving income on funds used for such pay-
ments."156 There is no North Carolina authority directly on point
but this position has merit and should be adopted. 157
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-17(a)(2) (1984). Neither § 1 of the REVISED UNI-
FORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, 7B U.L.A. 150, nor the New York version of the
REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §
11.2-1(o) (1967), provides that "trust" can be read as "estate."
155. R. COVEY, supra note 137, at 63-64. Mr. Covey poses the following
hypothetical:
[Aissume that a decedent's will creates a trust of $100,000 for A and
leaves his residuary estate outright to B, that the residuary estate is
$400,000 before the payment of administration expenses and estate taxes
and $250,000 after payment of these obligations, and that the value of
the estate remains constant during the period of administration. Is A's
share of the income (i) $100,000/$500,000, or (ii) $100,000/$350,000, or
(iii) $100,000/$500,000 before the payment is made and subject to reduc-
tion as other payments are made until it eventually becomes $100,000/
$350,000?
156. R. COVEY, supra note 137, at 64. He points out that, "[if] the rule were
otherwise, the administration expenses and estate taxes would have to be fixed
before the allocation could be finalized." But the interpretation suggested is open
to question. See, Covey, Allocation of Income Earned During Estate Administra-
tion-A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 2 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 1, 8
(1967).
157. Cf. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 210 N.C. 339, 186 S.E.2d 335
(1936), adopting the Massachusetts rule that all income earned during the admin-
istration of the estate not payable to others or otherwise disposed of by will is
distributable among the residuary legatees. Even though the residue is considered
formed at the time of death, "'where the gift of the residue is after the payment
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Finally, as also pointed out by Covey, the interaction of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 37-21(b)(2)"58 and § 37-30(a) 15 9 can cause an inequita-
ble allocation of income tax on undistributed estate income where
non-pro rata distributions of income are made.160 The following
clause, Covey suggests, would avoid these results:
I direct that any income taxes imposed upon or chargeable to
the income of my estate shall be apportioned to and deducted
from the shares of all beneficiaries (exclusive of any charitable
beneficiary) having an interest in such income in such equitable
manner as my executors shall determine. Any such determination
shall be conclusive as to all persons interested in the income of
my estate. 16
In most estates, the surviving spouse will receive all net in-
of debts and similar charges and non-deferred legacies, the residue is to be formed
subject to all such payments, even though actually made at a later time.'" Id. at
343, quoting Old Colony Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 Mass. 500, 165 N.E. 657 (1929).
Accord Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Grubb, 233 N.C. 22, 62 S.E.2d 719 (1950);
Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N.C. 611, 36 S.E.2d 17 (1945). But cf., Fish v. Hanson, 223
N.C. 141, 25 S.E.2d 463 (1943) (dictum). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(b) (1984) ex-
pressly provides for distribution of "income from assets of a decedent's estate
after the death of the decedent and before distribution, including income from
property used to discharge liabilities." The New York version of the statute in-
cludes a proviso clause that indicates that the fraction should change if taxes are
paid. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11.2-1(f)(2) (1967). Estate of Palitz, 331
N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sur. Ct. 1972).
158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(b)(2) (1984), quoted supra at note 124.
159. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-30(a) (1984), provides:
Regularly recurring taxes assessed against any portion of the principal
and any tax levied on receipts defined as income under this Article or the
trust instrument shall be charged against income.
160. Mr. Covey's illustration bears quotation:
To illustrate, assume that the residuary estate is divided equally between
A and B, that the estate income is $10,000 and that income of $3,000 is
paid to A but nothing is paid to B. A would be taxed on $3,000. His share
of the undistributed income would be charged with one-half of the in-
come taxes payable with respect to the retained income of $7,000-obvi-
ously an inequitable result. The proper result would be for his share of
the retained income to be charged with only two-sevenths of the taxes on
$7,000.
R. COVEY, supra note 137, at 65 n.107.
161. R. COVEY, supra note 137, at 65:
This provision should be used (a) if the will provides a pecuniary amount
formula provision and the surviving spouse is not to receive all estate
income; or (b) if the will creates any pre-residuary trusts for a second
recipient; or (c) if the residuary estate is divided into two or more shares.
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come of the estate under the will. Where that is not the case and in
larger estates and in estates in which fractional share bequests are
used, draftsmen should be aware of these provisions of the Act and
consider providing other directions for the fiduciary in appropriate
cases.
E. Apportionment of Tax on Trapping Distributions
There are significant tax planning opportunities where trusts
are created under a will because the estate's DNI16 2 can be divided
among a greater number of taxable entities. 163 Under the DNI
rules, any distribution, whether principal or income, carries out a
proportionate share of the estate's DNI to the distributee,1" which
162. I.R.C. § 643(a) (1985).
163. Indeed, this one-time opportunity to save income tax is a strong argu-
ment against indiscriminate use of revocable trusts as testamentary substitutes.
See generally Brackney, Post-Mortem Tax Planning for Estates, 15 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 581, 621-25 (1979); Hale, After Death Tax Planning-Payments and
Distributions, TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 302-2d, at A-17 to -19 (1984); Cohan &
Frimmer, Trapping Distributions-The Trap That Pays, 112 TR. & EST. 766
(1973); Cornfeld, Trapping Distributions, 14 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1400-1407
(1980).
With respect to such distributions in kind, made after June 1, 1984, and in
taxable years ending after that date, I.R.C. § 643(d)[e] (1985) requires that the
amount taken into account under I.R.C. § 661(a)(2) (1985) and § 662(a)(2) (1985)
shall be the lesser of the basis of the property before the distribution or the fair
market value of the distribution, and the recipient's basis for the property shall
be its basis immediately prior to distribution. An exception to this general rule is
that the executor or trustee may elect to recognize gain or loss as if the property
were sold to the recipient in which case the amount taken into account under the
cited sections is the fair market value of the property and the recipient acquires a
basis equal to the property's date of distribution value. The effect of this new
statute is to dampen the effectiveness of trapping distributions in that the fiduci-
ary now has to use basis instead of fair market value to determine the amount of
the distribution, but planning opportunities do exist. Aucutt, Tax Planning for
In-kind Distributions Increased by New Special Election, 62 J. TAX'N 48 (1985);
Kelly, Treatment of Property Distributed In-kind Under the Tax Reform Act of
1984, 63 TAXES 423 (1985); Freeland, Maxfield & Sawyer, Estate & Trust Distri-
bution of Property In Kind After the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 40 TAX L. REV.
449 (1985); Lassila, The Trust Taxation Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of
1984: Analysis, Implications and Planning Considerations, 63 TAXES 364 (1985).
It is likely that equitable adjustment claims will become more frequent in re-
sponse to the actions of fiduciaries under this statute. A provision exonerating the
fiduciary from any liability with respect to such elections and the failure or re-
fusal to make equitable adjustments may be advisable. See Lassila, supra.
164. I.R.C. § 662(a)(2) (1985).
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includes a trust.16 5 Accordingly, for example, annual principal dis-
tributions to testamentary trusts become part of each trust's
corpus, although such distributions are income for tax purposes
under the DNI rules and each trust is taxable on that income. The
income is "trapped" in the trusts, to be taxed on the trusts' re-
turns. The question, of course, is whether the income beneficiary or
remainderman of the trust is to bear the tax on this trapped distri-
bution of income.
If the trustee is required to operate under the Act, he is re-
quired to allocate the tax to principal by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-
30(b). 6 ' More than likely, the distribution was accomplished to re-
duce the overall income tax burden of the income beneficiary 6 7
who, at least in New York, is usually required to bear the tax bur-
den."6 8 North Carolina fiduciaries, on the other hand, are reported
customarily to charge corpus with this expense.6 9 It may be (and
probably would be in the footnote example 71) that a testator gen-
165. Treas. Reg. § 1.643(c)-1 (1986). Trapping distributions are more neatly
made to simple trusts which do not present the complexities of the throwback
rules (I.R.C. § 665-668 (1985). See generally, Hale, supra note 163, at A-17 to -19.
166. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-30(b) (1984):
Any tax levied upon profits, gains or receipts allocated to principal shall
be charged against principal notwithstanding denomination of the tax as
an income tax by the taxing authority.
167. Using the example suggested by Brackney, supra note 163, assume a
typical estate plan with a power of appointment marital deduction trust, and a
unified credit trust the income from which is payable to the spouse with remain-
der to the children. The executors distribute estate income (which is significant)
to the spouse during administration. If the spouse enjoys substantial separate in-
come and a commensurate tax burden, it might be beneficial to make a substan-
tial principal distribution to the two trusts in the same year as the distribution is
made to spouse. For example, if the estate had $60,000 in income, distributable to
the spouse, and made a principal distribution of $150,000 to each trust, only
$16,666.67 ($60,000 to spouse divided by $360,000 total distribution) of the distri-
bution to the spouse is imbued with income characteristics. The trusts, each taxed
on $21,666.67, pay significantly less income tax than the spouse would have in his
marginal bracket. The distributions significantly benefit the income benefi-
ciary-the spouse-at a tax cost to the remaindermen. Under different circum-
stances, for example, children by a former marriage, the remaindermen might be
inclined to complain. Indeed, an astute guardian might complain on behalf of nat-
ural children under appropriate circumstances.
168. Hubbard & Parr, The Principal-Income Dilemma, 111 TR. & EST. 98
(1972).
169. Carrico & Bondurant, Equitable Adjustments: A Survey and Analysis
of Precedents and Practice, 36 TAx LAW. 545, 614 (1983).
170. Note 167, supra.
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erally prefers for the income beneficiaries, who may be his wife and
children, not to be taxed on such distribution, preferring instead
that the tax fall on the corpus which will ultimately be received by
more remote takers. But that is not always the case. If it be more
equitable for the one who receives the tax benefit to bear the tax
burden, the trustee needs discretion or else direction 171 from the
instrument. Without it, the mechanics of the DNI rules will allo-
cate the tax to the remainderman unless he can convince the court
that, for equitable reasons, "receipts allocable to principal"'172 do
not include trapping distributions.
In substance, that was the question before the court in the
now famous Holloway case. 7 3 In Holloway, the executor had made
trapping distributions to four trusts, thereby transferring income
tax liability from the estate income account to the trust principal
account. A guardian ad litem for the remainder beneficiaries pro-
posed an adjustment. Although the New York version of the Re-
vised Uniform Principal and Income Act' 71 did not apply because
the distributions were made prior to its adoption, the court at the
first hearing 7 5 found that the statute codified earlier New York
case law holding that trapping distributions were "receipts alloca-
ble to principal" and that the trustees were therefore not unrea-
sonable in refusing to make the adjustment. The New York State
Bankers Association then joined forces with the guardian ad litem,
the trustees agreed to take no position, having been absolved from
any impropriety in the first decision, and the court agreed to a re-
hearing. On rehearing, the surrogate reversed himself, basing his
decision squarely "upon the purely equitable principle that the
burden of income taxes should be charged to the account into
171. There are uncertain tax consequences arising from equitable adjust-
ments. See R. COVEY, supra note 137, at 55-56.
In a marital deduction trust, it would, of course, be inadvisable to have the
will contain a direction that income from the trust bear this tax. Such a require-
ment would run afoul of the rule that the surviving spouse receive all of the trust
income.
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-30(b) (1984) (emphasis added).
173. In re Holloway, 327 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sur. Ct. 1972), reversing on reh'g 323
N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sur. Ct. 1971).
174. Both the New York statute, N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-
2.1(/)(4)(c) (1967), considered by the Holloway court, and the REVISED UNIFORM
PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 13(c)(4) (1985) are identical to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-
30(b) (1984).
175. In re Holloway, 323 N.Y.S.2d 534, reversed on reh'g, 327 N.Y.S.2d 865
(Sur. Ct. 1971).
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which the taxed item goes. 17 6
The precedential value of this decision lies not only in its
landmark requirement of an equitable adjustment for trapping dis-
tributions but also in its recognition that the applicable provisions
of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act do not preempt
the court's equity powers. As has been recognized, this is impor-
tant because the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act does
not provide for equitable apportionments.1 77 But neither the Re-
vised Uniform Principal and Income Act nor N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-
30(b)178 can be viewed as if in a vacuum. A personal representative
has discretionary power to make principal distributions 179 which,
because of the federal taxing statutes, are taxed as income to the
recipient trust. That discretion, it could be argued, is the precipi-
tating tax event.180 That the Act, in responding to that discretion-
ary decision, takes the tax from the pockets of those not receiving
the income should be no barrier to equitable relief to correct an
irrational and unfair result.18'
The obvious point is the necessity for consideration of the
problem in the planning stage. The drafting solutions would seem
to be to (1) require the adjustment, (2) require the adjustment in
accordance with a formula, (3) give the fiduciary discretion to
make an adjustment, or (4) prohibit an adjustment.'82 The com-
176. In re Holloway, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869. It was made to appear to the court
that New York fiduciaries regularly made such adjustments when using trapping
distributions. See Parr, Distributions by Estates, A Review of the Tax Conse-
quences, 107 TR. & EST. 97 (1968).
177. Dobris, Equitable Adjustments in Postmortem Income Tax Planning:
An Unremitting Diet of Warms, 65 IowA L. REv. 103, 129 (1979). Neither does the
North Carolina Act provide for equitable apportionments. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-
18(a) (1984).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-30(b) (1984).
179. Strictly speaking, a personal representative makes distributions before
settlement of all claims, debts and administration expenses at his own risk, e.g.,
Mallard v. Patterson, 108 N.C. 255, 13 S.E.2d 93 (1891); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-22-
1 (1984). Earlier distributions, are, however, commonly made where an estate is
amply solvent.
180. See A. MICHAELSON & J. BLATTMACHR, supra note 40, at 56 n.111.
181. In re Holloway, 327 N.Y.S.2d 865. Cf. Estate of Bixby, 140 Cal. App. 2d
326, 295 P.2d 68 (1956); In re Estate of Cooper, 186 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966); Holcombe v. Ginn, 296 Mass. 415, 6 N.E.2d 351 (1936). But cf. In re
Dick, 218 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sur. Ct. 1961); New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v.
Converse, 373 Mass. 639, 369 N.E.2d 982 (1977)(citing practical objections).
182. Carrico & Bondurant, supra note 169, at 566-67.
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plexities and uncertainties '8 3 of an exact adjustment (if that is pos-
sible) and the inflexibility of the formula approach recommend
against their use. Prohibiting adjustments, perhaps appropriate in
smaller estates,"" may discourage the exercise of fiduciary powers
in other areas and can create unexpected disparities. A simple dis-
cretionary power to make adjustments is the most sensible solu-
tion. It allows the fiduciary to weigh the tax consequences and the
added accounting costs resulting from a complex adjustment in the
balance with his duties to the trust in general.18 5 Appropriate lan-
183. See generally, Dobris, Limits on the Doctrine of Equitable Adjustment
in Sophisticated Postmortem Tax Planning, 66 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1981); Hale,
supra note 163, at A-18 to -21 (discussing throwback rules and potential income
tax impact of the reimbursement of principal); Cornfeld, supra, note 163, at
1405.
184. See generally, Dobris, supra note 183. Professor Dobris concludes "that
when the inequality is clear and apportionment is easy, courts should require an
equitable adjustment. When the inequality is unclear, or the apportionment hard
to make, courts should not require an adjustment." Id. at 280. A similar standard
for making equitable adjustments may be appropriate for fiduciaries having
discretion.
Some draftsmen (and certainly fiduciaries) will decide against any such ad-
justments and will use language substantially as follows:
I authorize my fiduciaries, in their absolute discretion, to exercise all
tax elections contained in the tax laws affecting my estate and the trust
created hereunder regardless of the effect such exercise may have on any
interest created hereunder or on any beneficiary. And I direct that no
equitable adjustment shall be made on account of such exercise.
Furthermore, I authorize my fiduciaries, in their absolute discretion,
to exercise all other management powers, express or implied, regardless
of the tax effects such exercise may have on any interest created hereun-
der or on any beneficiary. And, I direct that no equitable adjustment
shall be made on account of any disproportionate tax effect of such
exercise.
By the use of the foregoing language, I intend to excuse my fiducia-
ries from the duty of impartiality with respect to the tax effect of the
exercise of all their management powers insofar as that duty requires the
making of equitable adjustments when fiduciary action has an unfair im-
pact on beneficiaries.
Dobris, supra note 183, at 341.
185. Carrico & Bondurant, supra note 169, at 566-67; Cornfeld, supra note
163, at 1 1405. For a discussion of problems and solutions regarding beneficiaries
serving as fiduciaries, see Moore, Conflicts in Post-mortem Estate Planning after
the Tax Reform Act, 12 INST. EST. PLAN. 1 1920 (1975) and see Ascher, The Fidu-
ciary Duty to Minimize Taxes, 20 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 663, 700 (1985)
wherein Professor Ascher persuasively argues the fiduciary duty as developed in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 169-81 (1959), as a "duty owed to the bene-
214 " [Vol. 8:173
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guage might provide:
I authorize my executor to exercise or to refrain from exercis-
ing any election, option, discretion, or choice available under any
provision [of this will, of state law and] of any tax law applicable
to my estate or me if my executor in good faith believes such ex-
ercise or nonexercise to be in the best interest of one or more of
my estate or any of my beneficiaries, regardless of the fact that
either a particular tax or the total of all taxes applicable to my
estate or me is thereby increased or that there is a change in the
proportions in which various beneficiaries (including my execu-
tor) share in my estate. My executor [may, but] shall not be re-
quired of to[,J adjust any beneficiary's interest on account of any
action authorized by the foregoing sentence.'86
F. Corporate Distributions: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-22
The North Carolina Statute8 ' is quite similar to the language
of the 1962 Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act. 188 No use-
ful purpose would be served by an exegesis of this part of the Act,
for the problems and solutions of allocations of corporate distribu-
tions have been the subject of volumes by courts' and commenta-
tors.' 90 In general, the Act' 9' adopts the Massachusetts Rule hold-
ficiaries" is actually a duty owed to the trust, not to the beneficiaries whose inter-
ests are so diverse they could not possibly all be accommodated. This analysis
provides a more reasonable approach to questions involving fiduciary duty to dis-
parate and irreconcilable interests of successive beneficiaries.
186. Asher, supra note 185, at 715.
187. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-22 (1984).
188. REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, 7B U.L.A. 150 (1985).
189. The modern cases are collected in Annot., 81 A.L.R.3D 876 (1977). See
also Annot., 98 A.L.R.2D 511 (1964); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2D 1277 (1955); Annot., 27
A.L.R.2D 1323 (1953); Annot., 130 A.L.R. 492 (1941).
190. Robinson, Trust Allocation Doctrine and Corporate Stock: The Law
Must Respond To Economics, 50 TEx. L. REV. 747 (1972); Comment, Distribution
of Stock Dividends by Trustees Under the Pennsylvania Principal and Income
Act, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1969); Note, Principal and Income Allocation of Stock Dis-
tributions-The Six Per Cent Rule, 64 MICH. L. REV. 856 (1966); Flickinger, A
Trustee's Nightmare: Allocation of Stock Dividends Between Income and Princi-
pal, 43 B.U.L. REV. 199 (1963); Comment, Trusts-Apportionment of Stock Dis-
tributions Under the Pennsylvania Rule, 63 DICK. L. REV. 276 (1959); Scott, Prin-
cipal or Income?-How Dividends are Treated Under Proposed Revision Of
Uniform Act, 100 TR. & EST. 180 (1961); Cohan & Dean, Legal, Tax and Account-
ing Aspects of Fiduciary Apportionment of Stock Proceeds: The Non-Statutory
Pennsylvania Rules, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1957).
191. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-22(d) (1984).
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ing that stock dividends are principal and cash dividends are
income.192 The Act allocates all corporate distributions to income
(including distributions, notwithstanding that they are in shares of
the corporation, falling within the exceptions stated in I.R.C. §
305(b)(1)-(4)' 93), with the following exceptions: stock dividends
and stock splits are principal, 94 as are distributions pursuant to a
call of shares, a merger, consolidation, or reorganization, or a total
or partial liquidation.'95 Distributions from ordinary income or re-
alized capital gains by a regulated investment company or real es-
tate investment trust are income, 196 but other distributions by such
entities are principal. 97 There is no provision for apportionment of
corporate distributions between income and principal where death
occurs before payment. 98
Whether the Act or some other method of allocation more
nearly approximates the intent of any testator or settlor is cer-
tainly open to question. 99 One may not have wanted all stock divi-
192. This was the prior law in North Carolina. Humphrey v. Lang, 169 N.C.
601, 86 S.E. 526 (1915).
193. I.R.C. §§ 305(b)(1)-(4) (1985).
194. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-21(a) (1984).
195. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-22(b) (1984).
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-22(c) (1984).
It is reported that the mutual fund industry opposed this provision of the
REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 6, 7B U.L.A. 163, which allocates
to income distributions by regulated investment companies if made from ordinary
income or from realized capital gain. For example, a trustee may own IBM stock
and also have an investment in IBM through a mutual fund. If the trustee sells
his IBM stock, the capital gain is allocated to principal; if the mutual fund dis-
tributes an accrual from its sale of IBM stock, the Act allocates the receipt to
income. Panel Discussion, Uniform Revised Principal and Income
Act-Discussion of Newly Promulgated Statute, 101 TR. & EST. 894 (1962).
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-22(c) (1984) (second sentence).
198. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 236.1. See In re Bulis, 240 N.C. 529, 82
S.E.2d 750 (1954).
199. E.g., Note, Principal and Income Allocation of Stock Distribu-
tion-The Six Percent Rule, 64 MICH. L. REV. 856 (1966).
[I]t has frequently been asserted that in doubtful questions as be-
tween life beneficiaries and remaindermen the creator of the trust would
prefer to decide in favor of the life beneficiary, since the life beneficiary
is ordinarily the nearest and dearest in relation to him. Such a general-
ization may be well founded, as where the testator leaves his property in
trust for his widow for life with remainder to distant relatives or to char-
ity. It is not so clear where the remaindermen are his children. A court
can hardly take judicial notice that a man loves his wife more than he
loves his children.
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dends allocated to principal, for example, but the Act does so, to
the detriment of the income beneficiary who may have been the
preferred beneficiary in the settlor's or testator's mind, had he
been alerted to the question.200 Clearly in most instances fiduciary
discretion is preferable to the Act which admittedly favors simplic-
ity over fairness. For example, discretion would allow the fiduciary
to compensate in favor of the income beneficiary by allocating
stock dividends to income where he had exercised his investment
discretion in A manner not favorable to that beneficiary. 20 1
These are matters that should be covered at the drafting
stage. If the testator or settlor desires to protect the principal and
to prevent dilution of control of the corporation, appropriate lan-
guage might provide the following direction:
Unless inconsistent with other provisions of this instrument,
to consider and treat as principal all dividends payable in stock of
the issuing corporation, all dividends in liquidation and all
"rights" to subscribe to securities of the issuing corporation, and
to consider and treat as income all other dividends and rights re-
ceived (except those declared and payable as of a "record date"
preceding my death, which shall be considered and treated as
principal)."2
This language must not be used for a marital deduction trust be-
cause of the likelihood that the spouse-beneficiary might be de-
prived of the substantial enjoyment of "all the income" of the trust
and the marital deduction would be lost.203
Where trustee discretion is preferred, the following discretion-
ary power might be appropriate:
To apportion extraordinary and stock dividends and other
property received and charges incurred between income and prin-
cipal and to allocate to principal and to income such part or all of
such receipts and expenses as in its discretion are properly
chargeable or credited thereto.2 14
3 A. ScoTT, supra note 2, at § 236.3 at 1985.
200. See generally, G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT supra note 2, at § 859.
201. See Sherman v. Sherman, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 334, 202 N.E.2d 443 (Prob. Ct.
1962)(discussed supra note 34).
202. WACHOVIA WILLS AND TRUST MANUAL XI-5 (1958 ed., 1978 repl. pg.).
203. See supra note 76.
204. WACHOVIA WILLS AND TRUST MANUAL XI-5, n.3 (1958 ed., 1978 repl. pg.).
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G. Bond Premium and Discount: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-23
The general trust law rule is that where a trustee receives at
the creation of the trust bonds which are selling at premium, he
has no duty either to sell or to set aside from the income an amor-
tization fund. All of the interest on the bonds is income.20 5 On the
other hand, if a trustee purchases bonds at a premium, the weight
of authority is that he must or may properly set aside from the
interest a sufficient amount to amortize the premium over the life
of the bond.206 Because of the practical difficulties involved in
amortization of premiums (including the uncertainty as to the ex-
act amount of the premium attributable to the higher interest rate
obtained20 7 ) and the usual small amounts at stake, the Act,20 8 like
the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act,20 9 provides that
bonds are principal at inventory value210 and that bond premiums
shall not be amortized. Sale proceeds are principal.
Where a trust estate includes at its creation bonds selling at a
discount, the income beneficiary is entitled, under general trust
rules, only to the interest received on the bonds. Likewise, where a
trustee purchases bonds at a discount, the weight of judicial au-
thority is "that not only has the trustee no duty or power to pay
the life beneficiary out of the principal the amount of the probable
increase in value of the bonds as they approach maturity, but even
though the bonds are paid at maturity and the increase in value of
the principal is thus realized, no part of the proceeds is allocable to
income."' 21 Practical considerations are the primary recommenda-
205. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 239.2.
206. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 239, comment f; G.
BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 2, at § 828; Black, Amortization, and the
Problems of Discount Bonds in Trust Accounting, 21 B.U.L. REV. 305 (1941);
Note, Amortization of Bond Premiums and Discounts-Legal Justice v. Trustee
Convenience, 28 NEB. L. REV. 576 (1949). See Annot., 131 A.L.R. 426 (1941).
207. Comm'r v. Korell, 176 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1949).
208. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-23(a) (1984).
209. REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 7(a), 7B U.L.A. 165
(1985).
210. This affirms the rule stated in the first sentence of this paragraph that a
trustee receiving bonds purchased by the settlor or testator at a premium is not to
amortize the premium-the value of the bond at receipt (inventory value) is prin-
cipal. See Note, An Aspect of the Uniform Principal and Income Act as Relative
to Premiums and Discounts on Bonds, 20 TEMP. L.Q 472 (1947). For tax treat-
ment of amortizable bond premiums, see I.R.C. § 171 (1985).
211. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 240.2; G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note
2, § 826.
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tion for this rule. 212 This is the rule adopted by the Act.21 3
Where, however, the obligation is bought at a discount and is
payable at maturity in a fixed amount and redeemable before ma-
turity at prices set in advance, the income beneficiary ("who was
the income beneficiary at the time of increment 214) is entitled
under the Act to have the increment in value distributed to him
from the first principal cash available.15 So, for example, where a
trust holds callable bonds, the income beneficiary at the time the
bonds became subject to the trust or at the time of the purchase of
such bonds is entitled to be paid cash equivalent to the increment
as cash is available from principal during the time the bonds are
maturing. If there is no principal cash available, he is entitled to be
paid when cash is realized from the bonds "by sale, redemption, or
other disposition."21 This provision of the Act does not apply to
212. There are, however, practical considerations that we think lead to
the conclusion that such accumulation ought not to be made. There is, in
truth, no fund out of which such accumulation from discount may be
made. It is in the main duty of the trustee to keep the corpus of the trust
fund invested. The discount is not in fact realized until the bond is paid
either at maturity or on call. If the payment of the proportional incre-
ment of the discount is to be made to the life tenant with each install-
ment of income, the money must be procured from some source. There is
no obvious source from which it may rightly be obtained in the ordinary
estate. This theory rests upon the assumption that every bond purchased
by a trustee is safe and will be paid at par on call or at maturity. That
presumption is not in every instance true. Losses occur. A trust invest-
ment may be justified although it turns out to be unsafe. If the income
has been disbursed on the footing that the discount will be paid and that
expectation should be disappointed, the corpus of the trust must suffer
the loss to the extent it has been drawn upon in anticipation of full pay-
ment. If the discount should not be realized, the trustee would be in an
unfortunate position if he had attempted to forestall an event which did
not come to pass. If payment is delayed until the bond is paid and the
discount realized, the life tenant at that time may not be the only person
chiefly intended to be benefitted by the founder of the trust. The amount
of discount at which a bond may be purchased is not dependent on any
single feature .... "[Tihe amount of the discount at which a bond is
bought is the blend of a number of possible contributing causes, among
which the nominal rate of interest in relation to the market rate is one. It
cannot be said to be the only one."
Old Colony v. Comstock, 290 Mass. 377, 382-83, 195 N.E.2d 389, 392 (1935)(cita-
tions omitted).
213. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-23(a) (1984).
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-23(b) (1984).
215. Id.; See 3 A. Scorr, supra note 2, at § 233.1.
216. Practicalities have here again outweighed the income beneficiary's inter-
19861 219
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Treasury Bills and may therefore be a trap for the unwary. Trea-
sury Bills have "no fixed schedule of appreciation" and so if the
Act applies, the increment in value when realized must be allo-
cated to principal, not to income as many fiduciaries might
assume.
217
The Act prefers the income beneficiary where bonds are pur-
chased at a premium, the remainder beneficiary where bonds are
purchased at a discount and the remainder beneficiary where the
trustee invests in Treasury Bills. Most settlors and testators would
wish for both interests to be treated fairly and equitably. The Act
does not attempt to accomplish such impartiality and its amend-
ment has been urged.21 8 Clearly discretion in the trustee is a pref-
erable solution to these problems. Appropriate language might
provide:
My trustee shall in his sole discretion have the authority to
charge or credit to principal any premiums and discounts on se-
curities, including treasury bills, purchased at more or less than
par. 21
9
ests; there is no provision for the time value of money he would have received
periodically over the term if cash had been available or if the investment had
been in assets producing current income.
217. This trap is suggested by Hauser, supra note 37, at § 69.606. See Eck,
Drafting Considerations in Appointing the Surviving Spouse as Trustee of the
Non-marital Trust, 45 MONT. L. REV. 215, 236 (1984). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-23
(1984) is identical to § 8 of the REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, 7B
U.L.A. 165-66 (1985). This provision for New York is different, with the apparent
design to cover Treasury Bills:
The increment in value of a bond or other obligation for the payment of
money bearing no stated interest but payable or redeemable at maturity
or at a future time at an amount in consideration of which it was issued
is income.
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 11-2.1(f)(2) (1967). See Bay, An Analysis of the
Treatment of Treasury Bill Transactions Effected Through Trusts, 58 J. TAX'N
135 (1983). There are apparently no cases on point. Annot., 72 A.L.R.2D 162, 211
(1960).
218. Burd, The Uniform Principal and Income Act: A Plea for Uniformity,
109 TR. & EST. 762 (1970). There may be significant postmortem tax planning
opportunities available if the trustee has discretion in this area. Tax Conse-
quences of Trustees' Powers To Allocate Classes of Income and Deductions, Re-
port of the Comm. on Tax. of Tr. Income of the A.B.A. 7 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.
J. 261, 267-68 (1972).
219. WACHOVIA WILLS & TRUST MANUAL XI-6 (1958 ed., 1978 repl. pg.).
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H. Depletion: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 37-25, -26 and -27
1. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-25: Disposition of Natural Resources
This section applies to receipts from the taking of depletable
natural resources 220 and tracks the provisions of the Revised Uni-
form Principal and Income Act except that the percentage of re-
ceipts required to be allocated to principal is higher.22 ' The pur-
pose of the Statute is to see that a part of the proceeds from
wasting assets is allocated to principal, to the remainderman. 222 It
applies to receipts under an agreement in existence at death or at
the creation of a trust as well as to receipts under agreements
made by the fiduciary.22 3
Focusing on planning, rather than on administration of an es-
tate or trust under this section, there are at least two problems
which strongly suggest that the fiduciary should have discretion in
this area.224 First, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-25(a)(3)125 requires a trus-
tee receiving royalties from a gravel pit to set aside fifty (50%)
percent of the gross receipts as a reserve for depletion although for
federal income tax purposes the depletion deduction would only be
220. "Depletable natural resources" include coal, oil, gas and all other natu-
ral metallic and non-metallic deposits, as distinguished from non-depletable natu-
ral resources which include for purposes of this section "timber, water, soil, sod,
dirt, turf or mosses." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-25(c) (1984). See I.R.C. § 613 (1985).
221. The REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT requires where the
receipts are not properly characterized as rent or otherwise allocated under a pro-
duction payment agreement,
• . . 27 and one-half percent of the gross receipts (but not to exceed 50%
of the net receipts remaining after payment of all expenses, direct and
indirect, computed without allowance for depletion) . . . be added to
principal as an allowance for depletion.
The Act provides:
Fifty percent (50%) of the gross receipts attributable to the permanent
severance of the natural resources (but not to exceed sixty-six and two-
thirds percent (66 2/3 %) of the net receipts attributable to the permanent
severance of the natural resources remaining after payment of all ex-
penses, direct and indirect, computed without allowance for depletion)
shall be added to principal as an allowance for depletion.
222. See generally 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 239.3; G. BOGERT & G. Bo-
GERT, supra note 2, at § 827; Annot., 18 A.L.R.2D 98 (1951); Wyler, The Appor-
tionment of Proceeds from Depletable Natural Resources Held in Trust, 18 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 391 (1967).
223. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-25(b) (1984).
224. Hauser, supra note 37, at § 69.605.
225. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-25(a)(3) (1984) (portion quoted supra note 221).
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five (5%) percent. 226
Second, because oil and mineral interests held in trust may be
widely diversified geographically, the fiduciary should not be called
upon to determine which forum's law applies in determining the
propriety and extent of a reserve for depreciation. Where the trust
makes no provision as to the allocation of receipts or expenses to
income or principal and no provision as to what state's law is to
govern, a question of the conflict of laws may arise.227 The general
rule is that the administration of a trust of real property, including
the allocation of principal and income, is governed by the law of
the forum where the land lies.228 But there is a conflict of author-
ity. Where depletable properties are likely to be held by an estate
or trust, the appropriate instrument at least should specify what
state's law is to govern administration, if no direction is made re-
226. I.R.C. § 613(b)(6)(a) (1985). This is not to suggest that a five percent
allocation would be more appropriate than a fifty percent allocation in any situa-
tion. The suggestion is that the allocation does appear high and that as a practical
matter such a requirement might in certain circumstances thwart a trustee's op-
portunity to liquidate a depletable natural resource because of the unfairness of
the allocation in that situation. Compare, e.g., Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14-7409 (1967)(receipts are income unless some part apportioned to principal in
the sole discretion of the trustee, but the apportionment may not exceed lesser of
twenty-seven and one-half percent of gross receipts or fifty percent of net re-
ceipts); California: CAL. CIVIL CODE § 730.09 (West, 1982)(same); Kansas: KAN.
STAT. ANN § 58-910 (1983)(22%); Maryland: MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 14-
209 (1974)(22%).
For federal tax purposes, in an estate the depletion deduction is "apportioned
between the estate and the heirs, legatees and devisees on the basis of the income
of the estate from such property which is allocable to each." Treas. Reg. § 1.611-
1(c)(5) (1986). For depletable property held in trust, the deduction is apportioned
between the income beneficiaries and the trustee on the basis of the trust income
from such property allocable to each unless the governing instrument or state law
requires or permits the trustee to maintain a depletion reserve. In the latter case,
the deduction is allocated to the trustee to the extent income is set aside for the
reserve and any part of the deduction in excess of the reserve is apportioned be-
tween the income beneficiaries and the trustee on the basis of trust income (in
excess of the reserve) allocable to each. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(c)(4) (1986). The
Regulations also provide that an allocation which gives any beneficiary or the
trustee a depletion deduction in excess of his pro rata share of trust income will
not be respected. Id. This position has been criticized as contrary to I.R.C. §
611(b)(3) (1985). Gilbert, Allocation of Depletion Among Trusts and Benefi-
ciaries, 39 TAXES 508, 511 (1961). See, Hay v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 813
(N.D. Tex. 1967)(upholding validity of Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(c)(4) (1986)).
227. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 586.
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICTS §§ 276-791 (1971); See
especially § 277, comment c. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 2, at § 296.
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specting allocations between principal and income. At best, the
trustee should be given discretion to make such allocations.229
2. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-26: Timber
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-2623o provides that proceeds from timber
sales "shall be allocated in accordance with G.S. 37-18(a)(3)." The
latter section23 provides that (if neither the instrument nor the
Act applies) allocations are to be made:
.. . in accordance with what is reasonable and equitable in view
of the interests of those entitled to income as well as of those
entitled to principal, and in view of the manner in which men of
ordinary prudence, discretion and judgment would act in the
management of their own affairs.
Presumably the fiduciary would take into account, besides the set-
tlor's intent appearing from the four corners of the instrument and
the other relevant circumstances of the parties, the provisions of
the mortality tables232 and the present value rules.233 This statu-
229. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 648, discussing and comparing In re Hal-
deman, 143 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1955)(New York testatrix with Texas oil wells, held
Texas law on depletion reserve applied); In re Atwater, 200 N.Y.S.2d 903
(1960)(New York testator with coal lands in West Virginia, held West Virginia
law on allocation of receipts applied) with Bruner's Estate, 363 Pa. 552, 70 A.2d
222 (1950)(Pennsylvania testator with oil and gas leases in Indiana and Illinois,
held Pennsylvania law on allocation of receipts applied); Central Standard Life
Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 17 Ill. 2d 220, 161 N.E.2d 278 (1959)(Illinois intervivos trust
administered in Illinois, owning oil and gas properties in other states, held Illinois
law on allocation of receipts applied).
230. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-26 (1984). This provision is identical to § 10 of the
REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, 7B U.L.A. 171 (1985).
The principal draftsman of the REVISED UNIFORM ACT reports that the ques-
tion of allocating receipts and expenditures arising from timber rules bothered the
commissioners perhaps more than any other question. But because it was impossi-
ble to find a rule that would cover all situations, this section abandoned simplicity
and certainty in favor of fiduciary discretion and standards of fairness. Dunham,
Highlights of Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 102 TR. & EST. 210
(1963).
231. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-18(a) (1984).
232. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-46 (1984).
233. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-47 (1984) (six percent return for real property). For
federal tax purposes, the gain would be allocated between a life tenant and a
remainderman on a similar basis using 10% tables. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-5
(1986). Rev. Rul. 71-122, 1971-1 C.B. 234.
See Bartlett v. Pickering, 113 Me. 96, 92 A. 1008 (1915)(trustee holding "wild
lands" cut more than that part of timber which represented annual growth, held
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tory standard for allocating proceeds from timber sales between
principal and income under a "prudent man rule" leaves the fidu-
ciary open to criticism by second guessers. Absent explicit alloca-
tion instructions, either the fiduciary's judgment should be made
conclusive by a special provision in the instrument or he should be
given broad discretion in this area.
3. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-27: Other Property Subject to
Depletion
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-2723' provides that wasting assets, 35
other than those covered by the preceding two sections, such as
leaseholds, patents and copyrights, receipts not in excess of five
(5%) percent per year of the greater of inventory value or market
value at the end of the fiscal or calendar year are income and the
balance is principal. The North Carolina provision is different from
that of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act in that the
Revised Uniform Act provides for allocation of receipts to income
"not in excess of five percent per year of [the properties'] inven-
tory value." The difference in the North Carolina Act represents a
substantial improvement over the Revised Uniform Act because it
eliminates disparities which can result from use of static inventory
proceeds apportioned, life tenant receiving equivalent to annual growth); First
Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Wefel, 252 Ala. 212, 40 So. 2d 434 (1949). Compare, e.g.,
Ballentine v. Poyner, 3 N.C. 110 (1800)(where juniper swamp land is suitable only
for growing wood for staves, shingles, etc., income beneficiary is entitled to pro-
ceeds and cutting is not waste) with Thomas v. Thomas, 166 N.C. 627, 82 S.E.
1032 (1914)(standing timber is considered corpus-life tenant is liable for waste if
he cuts it); Ward v. Sheppard, 3 N.C. 283 (1803)(same).
234. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-27 (1984) provides:
Other property subject to depletion. Except as provided in G.S. 37-25
and 37-26, if the principal consists of tangible or intangible property sub-
ject to depreciation, including leaseholds, patents, copyrights, royalty
rights, and rights to receive payments on a contract for deferred compen-
sation, or other intangible assets of a wasting nature, receipts from the
property, not in excess of five percent (5%) per year of its inventory
value or of its fair market value at the end of the particular fiscal or
calendar year, whichever is greater, are income and the balance is
principal.
235. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 239 (1959); G. BOGERT & G.
BOGERT, supra note 2, at § 827; 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 239: "Wasting
property includes such property as leasehold interests; royalties; patent rights; in-
terests in things the substance of which is consumed such as mines, oil and gas
wells, quarries and timberlands; interests in things which are consumed in the
using or worn out by using, such as machinery and farm implements."
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value236 to measure income.287 But the improvement is one-sided
only: it helps the income beneficiary in cases where the value of
the asset appreciates, but forsakes238 the remainder beneficiary
when the value of the asset declines.
A settlor or testator may wish for the income beneficiary to
have all receipts or none at all or some other portion than five per-
cent of the greater of inventory value or current fair market value
of the asset. Planning with any certainty for testators is impossible
because the situation at death cannot be known: leaseholds may
have nearly expired or a new invention soon may threaten the
value of a patent. A rate of return greater or less than five percent
may sometimes be reasonable. Here, again, fiduciary discretion
may in proper cases be the appropriate approach.23 9 Certainly if
wasting assets are a significant part of an estate, at least the settlor
or testator should have a role in the decision and be informed of
this provision.
I. Underproductive Property: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-28
A trustee has a duty to an income beneficiary to make trust
property productive.24 When unproductive property is ultimately
236. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-17(a)(2) (1984) defines inventory value and is
quoted supra note 124.
237. See Abravanel, Apportioning Receipts From Wasting Assets Under the
Uniform Laws: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 58 N.C.L. REv. 255 (1980). The
author cites the case of George Bernard Shaw's will. At the time of Mr. Shaw's
death, the copyright value of Pygmalion was insignificant. The value rose consid-
erably the next year, when My Fair Lady was produced. A "five percent of inven-
tory value" under the REVISED UNIFORM AcT thus would have seriously prejudiced
the income beneficiary. Under the North Carolina Act, the greater fair market
value at the end of the second year could have been used as the base for this
calculation.
238. The fiduciary would seem, however, to have authority to reduce the allo-
cation to income in these situations. The language of the statute provides for an
allocation to receipts "not in excess of five percent per year" (emphasis supplied).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-27 (1984).
239. See Younger, Apportioning Receipts From Wasting and Unproductive
Assets: A Comment on the New Principal and Income Act, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1118, 1124 (1965), criticizing the New York Legislature for rejecting the five per-
cent solution ("part of the Uniform Act for over thirty years, and no complaints
that it is unfair have been heard of") in favor of "the vague standard of what is
reasonable, equitable and ordinarily prudent."
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 181; 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at §§
181, 240. Cf. Bank of Wadesboro v. Hendley, 229 N.C. 432, 50 S.E.2d 302
(1948)(approval of family settlement agreement to allow trust to sell unproductive
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sold so that the proceeds can be invested in income producing
property, a portion of the proceeds should be allocated to income.
Where a property subject to a trust produces substantially less in-
come than the ordinary rate of return on trust assets, the same
rule applies.241 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-28242 accomplishes this alloca-
tion and establishes a standard for how underproductive property
must be before it falls into the category of unproductive property.
Under the Act, if there is a sale of property, any portion of the
principal of which has not produced an average net income of at
least one percent per year of its inventory value for more than a
year, a part of the net proceeds of the sale is allocated to the in-
come beneficiary. The part of the proceeds so allocated is
equivalent to the difference between the net sale proceeds and an
amount which, had it been invested at four percent simple annual
interest while the property was underproductive, would have pro-
duced the net proceeds. The Act provides adjustments for past re-
ceipts of some income, the value of beneficial use by the income
beneficiary and carrying charges and expenses charged to income
while the property was underproductive. Unlike the Revised Uni-
form Principal and Income Act,2 43 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-28(c) 244
provides that no allocation shall be made if the trust corpus as a
farm); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnston, 269 N.C. 701, 153 S.E.2d 449
(1967)(equity will order sale of lands where necessary to preserve and protect the
estate); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Rasberry, 226 N.C. 586, 39 S.E.2d 601
(1946)(same); American Trust Co. v. Nicholson, 162 N.C. 257, 78 S.E. 152
(1913)(power of court to order sale upon application of trustee where property is
unproductive and beneficiary is in need); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-11 (1984) (power of
life tenant to force a sale of unproductive lands), applied in Stepp v. Stepp, 200
N.C. 237, 156 S.E. 804 (1931).
241. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 240; G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note
2, at § 824; and see Note, Unproductive Trust Property In Florida: Sacrificing
Yearly Return For Administrative Convenience, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 247 (1980);
Comment, Apportionment Between Principal and Income of Proceeds Derived
From the Sale of Unproductive Realty Held in Trust, 40 YALE L.J. 275 (1930);
Note, Unproductive Trust Assets In New York, 36 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 259 (1962);
Comment, Trust Administration-Apportionment and Other Remedies of an In-
come Beneficiary When the Trustee's Retention of Unproductive Property
Causes a Loss or Termination of Income, 58 MICH. L. REV. 1049 (1960); Shattuck,
Unproductive Trust Property in Massachusett, 20 B.U.L. REV. 447 (1940);
Brandis, Trust Administration: Apportionment of Proceeds of Sale of Unproduc-
tive Land and Of Expenses, 9 N.C.L. REV. 127 (1930).
242. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-28 (1984).
243. REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AcT § 12, 7B U.L.A. 173 (1985).
244. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-28(c) (1984).
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whole has generated an average of four percent of its inventory
value for each year that the trust principal included the under-
productive asset, even though the underproductive property sold
has produced none. The Act also provides a ceiling rule tied to the
difference between actual trust income and a computed income of
the trust at four percent per year.
For example, if the only trust asset were vacant land with an
inventory value of $100 which had been held for three years and
which had produced no income, upon a sale for $100 the "delayed
income" portion is computed as follows:
100.00 Gross proceeds
(8.00) Sale expense
(0.00) Capital gains tax
(2.00) Carrying charges (ad vaolrem taxes)
$ 90.00 Net proceeds
- 80.36 "Amount, which had it been invested at simple
interest at 4% per year while the property was
unproductive would have produced the net
proceeds." ($90.00 - 1.12)
9.64 Tentative delayed income
Ceiling Rule Computation-N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-28(c)(2):
Situation One: Same facts as above-only one trust asset.
Situation Two: In addition to the vacant land, the trust had
$100.00 cash invested at five (5%) percent,
yielding $5.00 per year.
Situation One Situation Two
12 24 "Income principal would produce
at 4% for 3 years." The statute
does not specify whether this
amount should be compounded.
0 15 Actual average net income for 3
years.
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12 9 Ceiling amount: in Situation One,
the ceiling amount is greater than
tentative delayed income, so the
tentative figure is delayed income
to which the income beneficiary is
entitled.
In Situation Two, the ceiling
amount is less than the tentative
figure, so the lesser ceiling amount
is the amount of delayed income
which can be paid to the income
beneficiary as delayed income.
There is delayed income under the Act even if the property is
sold at a loss.2 5
In cases except those involving a marital deduction trust,24 it
is probably prudent to authorize or even to direct the trustees to
hold or acquire unproductive or underproductive property. There
may be good reasons for doing so, such as maintaining control over
a family business or holding real estate during a depressed time
when there is the certain hope of future appreciation. And consider
this reason:
Thought should also be given, and guidance provided to the
trustees, with respect to the question of whether any part of the
ultimate proceeds of sale of the property is to be allocated to the
income beneficiaries of the trust.
Take, for example, a situation where the trust principal is
$100,000.00 of tax-exempt bonds producing a 5% return and
$100,000.00 of growth common stock paying no dividends, and
the sole income beneficiary is in the 70% income tax bracket. The
income beneficiary is receiving annually a 2 1/2 % return on the
principal, which is equal to a return of 8 1/3 % before taxes. As-
sume five years pass, the growth stocks have not grown, and they
245. For example, if the property in Situation 1 with an inventory value of
$100 were sold for $90 and there were $7 of sale expense and $2 carrying charges,
leaving a net proceed of $81, the income beneficiary would be entitled to $8.68
($81 - $81 / 1.12). But if the property is sold for a gain, and the statute applies to
entitle the income beneficiary to the "delayed income" it is taxed to him even
though it might not be distributed to him through mistake or other delay. Rev.
Rul. 85-116, 1985-31 I.R.B. 19.
246. To qualify for the marital deduction, the surviving spouse must have the
power to require the trustee to make non-income producing property income pro-
ducing. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) (1986).
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are sold for $100,000.00. Under the 1962 Uniform Act, the income
beneficiary would be entitled to $16,666.00 of the $100,000.00 of
proceeds.
Should he have it? Not only has he already had a substantial
return from the trust, under the facts he would not even have to
pay any tax on the $16,666.00 allocated to him as income; since
the sale of the growth stocks produced no capital gains, the distri-
bution of the portion of the proceeds of the sale to him will not
increase the distributable net income of the trust under §
643(a)(3) of the Code, and he will pay no tax on the distribution,
since the trust has no other taxable income. The net result at the
end of five years is that the income beneficiary will have received
an average annual return on the trust principal of 5.833% tax-
free, which is the equivalent of a before-tax return of 19.444%. 247
Whether the settlor or testator would have desired this result
is the question-but he may very well have wished to prefer the
remainderman in such a situation, to pass as much property as
possible free of estate or gift tax to the ultimate taker. It is his
decision to make and it should not be made by default by simply
including in the boilerplate of the instrument a reference to the
standard North Carolina fiduciary powers.
When it is unlikely that a significant portion of the trust
corpus will be comprised of such property and the trust is not a
marital deduction trust, it is probably advisable to provide for no
allocation to income of the proceeds of the sale of such property
simply to avoid the administrative inconvenience of the computa-
tion and of including such amounts in the distributable net income
of the trust.
J. Depreciation: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-37
The Act 248 requires fiduciaries to establish depreciation
247. Hauser, supra note 37, at 69.609.
248. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-37 (1984) provides:
Depreciation. A reasonable allowance for depreciation of property
subject to depreciation under generally accepted accounting principles
shall be charged against income, but no allowance for depreciation shall
be made for that portion of any real property used by a beneficiary as a
residence and no allowance for depreciation need be made for any prop-
erty held by the trustee on January 1, 1974, for which the trustee was not
then required to make and was not then making an allowance for
depreciation.
This provision is identical to § 13(a)(2) of the REViSED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL
AND INCOME ACT, 7B U.L.A. 176 (1985).
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reserves for property subject to depreciation.249 Part of the income
must be set aside for the remainder beneficiary to replace the prin-
cipal value lost over time due to physical deterioration or obsoles-
cence. This rule applies alike to improvements or other depreciable
assets owned by the settlor or testator at the time of the creation
of the trust or estate and those acquired or constructed by the fi-
duciary2 50 There are significant tax and economic consequences
springing from the establishment of reserves for depreciation or, if
the fiduciary has discretion to forego such reserves, from the fail-
ure to establish them.
1. Some Tax Considerations
An estate or trust is allowed a deduction for depreciation only
to the extent the deduction is not allowable to beneficiaries under
Section 167(h) of the Internal Revenue Code.251 Estates and trusts
are treated differently under this section of the Code. For trusts,
the deduction is apportioned between the income beneficiaries and
249. Since Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, 7 Ves. Jr. 137, 32 Eng. Rep. 56, 25
Eng. Rul. Cases 29 (1802), the general rule (and the rule of RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 239) has been that a fiduciary is under a duty to the remainder-
men to sell a wasting asset and invest the proceeds to produce income or, under
the RESTATEMENT view, to allow for amortization to protect the remaindermen.
But historically fiduciaries have not, and have not been required to, set aside a
reserve for depreciation of buildings owned by the settlor which became part of
the original trust estate. Scott suggests the reason may have been "a feeling that
the value of the land on which the building rests is likely to increase at least as
fast as the value of the building depreciates." 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 239.4
at 204A. See, Note, Allowance for Depreciation of Buildings Held in Trust for
Successive Beneficiaries, 60 HARV. L. REV. 952 (1947); Note, Trusts-Improved
Real Estate- Validity of Depreciation Reserves, 55 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1957).
There are apparently no North Carolina cases.
250. Where the fiduciary makes improvements which are not permanent, he
is required to deduct from the income each year enough to amortize the cost of
the improvement. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 233.3; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
TRUSTS §§ 233, 239, comment h (1959); Note, Allocation of the Cost of Improve-
ments to Real Property Held in Trust, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 932 (1968); Cf. Middle-
ton v. Rigsbee, 179 N.C. 437, 102 S.E. 780 (1920)("costs of permanent improve-
ments ... which tend to enhance the value of the remainderman's estate as well
as [the life tenant's] ... should be properly apportioned between them"). Perma-
nent improvements, on the other hand, are paid from principal. Woody v. Chris-
tian, 205 N.C. 610, 172 S.E. 210 (1933)(extensive repairs in order to make prop-
erty productive); see Capron, Reserves Against the Depreciation of Real Property
Held By a Trustee, 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 565 (1951); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3D 1309 (1966).
251. I.R.C. § 642(e) (1985). I.R.C. § 179, election to expense certain deprecia-
ble business assets, does not apply to estates and trusts. I.R.C. § 179(d)(4) (1985).
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the trustee in accordance with the provisions of the trust instru-
ment, or if there are no provisions, on the basis of trust income
allocable to each. If the trust instrument requires or permits the
trustee to establish a reserve and he does so, or if state law re-
quires a reserve, the deduction is first apportioned to the trust to
the extent of income set aside to the reserve and the balance in
excess of the amount set aside for the reserve is apportioned be-
tween the beneficiaries and the trustee in accordance with the pro-
visions of the trust instrument or on the basis of income allocable
to each.23 2 If no depreciation reserve is established and the trust is
a simple trust, the beneficiary gets the deduction.2 53
An estate, on the other hand, has no alternative method of
allocation, but must apportion the depreciation deduction between
the estate and "the heirs, legatees, and devisees" on the basis of
income allocable to each, rather than in accordance with the will.25
Examples are helpful:
Example One: Assume an estate in which the will incorporates
by reference the standard North Carolina fiduciary powers under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32-27, thereby requiring establishment of depre-
ciation reserves.2 55 Assume also, $5,000 of rental income and that
the executor has discretion to distribute that income to B. If the
depreciation deduction is $1,000 and that amount is held as a de-
preciation reserve, B receives $4,000. Section 167(h) of the Internal
Revenue Code allocates the deduction $800 [$4,000/5,000 X $1000]
to B and $200 [$1000/$5,000 X $1000] to the estate. Thus, B is
taxed on $3,200 and the estate on $800.256
Example Two: Same facts as Example One except that the
executor exercises his discretion not to establish a depreciation re-
serve. $5,000 is distributed to B and the entire $1,000 depreciation
deduction is his because no income is allocable to the estate. B's
taxable income is thus $4,000 and the estate has no taxable
income.
Example Three: The same facts as Example One except that
the entity is a simple trust and the trustee has standard North
Carolina fiduciary powers under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32-27 and is
252. Rev. Rul. 74-530, 1974-2 C.B. 188.
253. I.R.C. § 167(h) (1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(h)-1(b) (1986). See generally,
FERGUSON,, supra note 40, at 312.
254. I.R.C. § 167(h) (1985); Treas. Reg. 1.167(h)-1(c) (1986).
255. See text accompanying note 13, supra.
256. This example ignores personal exemptions. FERGUSON, supra note 40, at
314-15.
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therefore required to maintain a depreciation reserve. He does so,
withholding $1,000. Unlike Example One, above, for an estate, the
entire deduction for depreciation is apportioned to the trust so
that the trust has no taxable income and the beneficiary's taxable
income is $4,000.257
Example Four: The same facts as Example Three except that
the trustee is not required to maintain a depreciation reserve and
elects not to do so. If the trust is a simple trust, the beneficiary
gets the entire depreciation deduction. If the trust is a complex
trust and the trustee accumulates $1,000 of income, the same ap-
portionment method used in Example One, above, applies to give
the trust one-fifth [$1,000/$5,000] of the deduction and the benefi-
ciary four-fifths [$4,000/$5,000] of the deduction.
The Code refers to "pertinent provisions of the instrument"
which may control depreciation apportionment in the case of
trusts.5 Can the terms of the instrument or can the trustee by the
exercise of his discretion allocate the depreciation deduction other
than between the trust and beneficiaries commensurate with their
pro rata share of income? The Regulations say not.259 Although the
subject of criticism,26 0 this provision of the Regulations has been
257. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(h)-l(b) (1986); See Treas. Reg. § 1.661(c)-2 (1986),
e.g., McIntosh v. United States, 64-2 T.C. 9716 (D. Vt. 1964); FERGUSON, supra
note 40, at 315 n.78.
258. I.R.C. § 167(h) (1985) provides, in part:
In the case of property held in trust, the allowable deduction shall be
apportioned between the income beneficiaries and the trustee in accor-
dance with the pertinent provisions of the instrument creating the trust
259. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(h)-1(b) (1986) provides, in part:
(2) If under the trust instrument or local law the income of a trust is
to be distributed to a named beneficiary, but the trustee is directed to
maintain a reserve for depreciation in any amount, the deduction is al-
lowed to the trustee (except to the extent that income set aside for the
reserve is less than the allowable deduction). The same result would fol-
low if the trustee sets aside income for a depreciation reserve pursuant to
discretionary authority to do so in the governing instrument.
No effect shall be given to any allocation of the depreciation deduc-
tion which gives any beneficiary or the trustee a share of such deduction
greater than his pro rata share of the trust income, irrespective of any
provisions in the trust instrument, except as otherwise provided in this
paragraph when the trust instrument or local law requires or permits the
trustee to maintain a reserve for depreciation.
260. Hauser, supra note 37, at T 69.604.
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upheld. '61
The statutory provision regarding apportionment of the depre-
ciation deduction between estates and "heirs, legatees, and devi-
sees" is more clear.262 It might seem that in a typical estate plan in
which the surviving spouse is the income beneficiary of the marital
deduction trust and is entitled to estate income on that portion of
the estate and in which the will directs the executor to distribute
the unified credit amount to children who are also designated dis-
cretionary income beneficiaries of income on that amount during
estate administration, the surviving spouse would be entitled to a
depreciation deduction commensurate with the portion of the es-
tate's income distributed to her. Under the Fourth Circuit Nis-
sen 26s decision, however, the surviving spouse does not have the
requisite status as an "heir, legatee and devisee." In Nissen, the
will left the residue, including the Nissen Building in Winston-Sa-
lem, North Carolina, to Wachovia Bank and Trust Company as ex-
ecutor and trustee. Trusts were to be established for two benefi-
ciaries. One beneficiary was entitled to all income for life from the
trust for him; the other beneficiary was a discretionary income
beneficiary of the trust for her. The executor had discretionary au-
thority regarding allocations of principal and income and discre-
tionary authority to pay estate income to the two ultimate benefi-
ciaries of the trusts to be established. The executor exercised its
discretion and made distributions to the two beneficiaries but de-
ducted all depreciation on the estate income tax return. The Com-
missioner objected on the grounds that part of the deduction
should have been apportioned to the beneficiaries. The Tax
261. Dusek v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 355 (1966), affirmed, 376 F.2d 410 (10th Cir.
1967). In Dusek, the trustee was required to maintain a depreciation reserve but
was "authorize to apportion and allocate between the trust and the primary bene-
ficiary all appropriate tax deductions for . . . depreciation . . . ." The trustee
bought rental property, accumulated all but $100 of the income and attempted to
allocate the entire depreciation deduction to the beneficiary, wife of the grantor-
trustee. The plan was to have none of the rental income, but all of the deprecia-
tion deduction on the joint return of the grantor and beneficiary. The "pertinent
provisions of the instrument" language of I.R.C. § 167(h) was held to mean only a
provision allowing or requiring creation of depreciation reserves.
262. I.R.C. § 167(h) (1985) provides, in part:
In the case of an estate, the allowable deduction shall be apportioned
between the estate and the heirs, legatees, and devisees on the basis of
the income of the estate allocable to each.
263. In re Nissen's Estate, 345 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1965), reversing 41 T.C. 522
(1964).
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Court 264 agreed, but the Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court.2 , 5
The depreciation deduction is not lost, however, to the benefi-
ciary of an estate who is not an "heir, devisee [or] legatee" because
the mechanics of the distributable net income rules would operate
to reduce the estate's DNI, thereby reducing the taxable amount of
the distribution to such a beneficiary. 6 If the surviving spouse
were entitled to all of an estate's income pending establishment of
testamentary trusts of which the spouse was the beneficiary, the
distributable net income on which she is taxed is reduced by the
deduction. This also holds true if, in the example posed in the pre-
vious paragraph, the unified credit amount were left in trust for
remote takers with children as income beneficiaries (so that
neither the spouse nor the children would be "heirs, devisees, [or]
legatees"). In situations like the example in the previous paragraph
where the unified credit amount beneficiaries are "devisees" or
"legatees" the result is the same, although disparities can arise if
distributions to beneficiaries are made in different tax years of the
estate. The income distributed to the spouse is treated in the cal-
culation of the depreciation deduction apportionment as income
apportioned to the estate.67 Application of Nissen can, however,
make a substantial difference to beneficiaries in estates with facts
similar to those presented in that case, especially where adminis-
tration is prolonged. For example, in the distribution arrangement
of Nissen, if an estate has $10,000 income, is entitled to $5,000
depreciation deduction and distributes $5,000, the beneficiaries are
taxed on the whole $5,000; if $10,000 is distributed, the deduction
flows through by the DNI computation and the beneficiaries are
still taxed only on $5,000 and the estate has no taxable income.
Finally, apportionment of depreciation deductions cannot be
made in relation to ultimate disposition of the asset to which the
deduction is attributable.6 8 The depreciation apportionment rules
264. 41 T.C. 522.
265. In re Nissen's Estate, 345 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1965). Contra, Lamkin v.
United States, 533 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1976). Cf. Nemser v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 780
(1976), affirmed, 77-2 U.S.T.C. V 9406 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977).
266. I.R.C. § 643(a) (1985).
267. Rev. Rul. 74-530, 1974-2 C.B. 188, holding that amounts allocated to
beneficiaries of trusts and to heirs, legatees, and devisees of estates are not lim-
ited to the income allocated and may exceed such income, does not indicate a
different result.
268. Neither I.R.C. § 167(h) (1985) nor Treas. Reg. § 1.167(h)-i (1986) pro-
vides that the depreciation deduction is allocable in relation to the ultimate dis-
[Vol. 8:173
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applicable to trusts have the same effect. The draftsman cannot
anticipate that rental income allocable to and paid to the ultimate
distributee of a depreciable asset will be offset by all of the depre-
ciation deduction attributable to such property, even if a deprecia-
tion reserve is not established. For example, assume an estate not
required to establish depreciation reserves had net rental income
of $1,000, net interest income of $3,000, no expenses and $2,000 of
depreciation. The depreciable asset is distributable to A, the cash
to B. The executor elects to distribute rental income to A and in-
terest income to B. A will be entitled only to $250 of the deprecia-
ble deduction; B will get $750.
2. Economic Considerations
If the draftsman simply incorporates by reference the stan-
dard North Carolina fiduciary powers,269 the Act applies and de-
preciation reserves are required. A comparison of that result with a
discretionary decision not to establish a depreciation reserve is
best illustrated by the following example:
Example: Assume a simple trust with $15,000 rental income,
depreciation deduction available of $8,000, legal fees of $1,000,
commissions of $600. Column (a) represents no depreciation re-
serve; column (b) represents depreciation reserve of $8,000.
position of the asset to which the asset is attributable. Compare Treas. Reg. §
1.167(h)-l(b) (1986) (trust depreciation: "apportioned . . . on the basis of the
trust income allocable to each [i.e. trust and beneficiary]") and Treas. Reg. §
1.167(h)-1(c) (1986) (estate depreciation: "apportioned. . . on the basis of income
of the estate which is allocable to each [i.e. estate and heir, legatee, and devisee]")
with Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(c)(4) (1986) (trust depletion: "apportioned. . . on the
basis of the trust income from such property allocable to each [i.e. trust and ben-
eficiary]")(emphasis added). See FERGUSON,, supra note 40, at 316 n.81.
269. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27 (1984). See text accompanying note 13, supra.
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Column (a) Column (b)
FAI: I.R.C. § 643(b); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-19
Rents 15,000 15,000
Dep. Res. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-37 (8,000)
Legal fee N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-32(a) (500) (500)
Commission N.C. Gen. Stat. § 37-31(a) (300) (300)
FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTING INCOME 14,200 6,200
FEDERAL GROSS INCOME I.R.C. §§ 641.61
Rents 15,000 15,000
GROSS INCOME 15,000 15,000
TENTATIVE TAXABLE INCOME (TTI)
I.R.C. § 642(b) (300) (300)
I.R.C. § 212 (1,000) (1,000)
I.R.C. § 212 (600) (600)
I.R.C. § 642(e), 167(h) (8,000)
TTI 13,100 5,100
DISTRIBUTABLE NET INCOME (DNI)
I.R.C. § 643(a)(2) 300 300
DNI 13,400 5,400
I.R.C. § 651 DEDUCTION
FAI (I.R.C. § 651(a)) 14,200 6,200
or or or
DNI (I.R.C. § 651(b)) (lesser amount) 13,400 5,400
I.R.C. § 651 Deduction 13,400 5,400
TAXABLE INCOME
TTI 13,100 5,100
I.R.C. § 651 (13,400) (5,400)
TAXABLE INCOME -0- -0-
BENEFICIARY
I.R.C. § 651(a)
FAI 14,200 6,200
or or or
DNI (lesser amount) 13,400 5,400
BENEFICIARY'S INCOME 13,400 5,400
Depreciation deduction (8,000) -0-
BENEFICIARY TAXED ON 5,400 5,400
SUMMARY
Cash distributed 14,200 6,200
Amount taxed 5,400 5,400
AMOUNT RECEIVED TAX-FREE 8,800 1,200
If there are such things as haunts, the specter of the dead hus-
band would certainly follow the lawyer who failed to provide for
[Vol. 8:173236
64
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/2
N.C. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT
$8,000 of tax-free income to the surviving wife in this example. On
a more practical level, the wrath of the surviving wife herself may
be more fearful. More than likely, the husband would not have
wanted a depreciation reserve as required by the statute. And, in
many situations, there is a good chance inflation would make up
for a good portion of the depreciation reserve if none were
established.2 10
3. Planning
Where depreciable assets are to comprise a significant part of
an estate or trust, careful advance consideration of depreciation
consequences is essential.27 1 These decisions are largely for the set-
tlor or trustee and should not be left by default to the Act, or sim-
ply to the discretion of the fiduciary, for that matter. The provi-
sions of the instrument should be as definitive as practicable.
Specifically with regard to the Act, an exception must be made for
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32-27(29)272 if depreciation reserves are not to be
required. If the fiduciary is to have discretion, he should be given
some guidance concerning the extent to which the income benefi-
ciary is to be preferred. If the primary purpose of a trust is to pre-
serve corpus, it is best specifically to provide for depreciation
reserves and to include guidance for the fiduciary regarding what
allowance is considered reasonable.273 In many estates, as the text
example illustrates, fiduciary discretion will be appropriate.2 4
IV. CONCLUSION
If the Intestate Succession Act is a poor man's will, the North
Carolina Principal and Income Act of 1973 is a poor man's instruc-
270. See Eggar v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 717, 752 (1971); Knuthe, Depreciation &
Depletion: A Fiduciary Overview, 114 TR. & EST. 146 (1975).
271. See generally, Englebrecth & Cantrell, Depreciation and Depletion De-
ductions for Trusts and Estates, 120 TR. & EST. 37 (1981).
272. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(29) (1984). See text accompanying note 13,
supra.
273. A simple provision for a "reasonable allowance for depreciation" is inad-
visable. For example, if a settlor transfers an asset with a value of $100,000, a
depreciated basis of $10,000, and a remaining useful life of ten years, a "reasona-
ble allowance for depreciation" under generally accepted accounting principles
might be $10,000 per year, ten times the tax depreciation allowed. The settlor
may not have intended such a large amount to be withheld each year from the
income beneficiary. Hauser, supra note 37, at 1 69.604.
274. Appropriate language is quoted in the text, supra at note 15.
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tion to his fiduciary regarding allocations between principal and
income. The Act generally follows the common law and has almost
no provision for flexibility to accomplish equity between successive
interests. In most cases simplicity and certainty are preferred over
fairness. That is a workable solution which may yield appropriate
results in many cases. But it is probably not what a settlor or tes-
tator would choose if his wishes were considered.
It is the draftsman's job to consider those wishes and provide
for their accomplishment. If he makes no provision or incorporates
by reference the North Carolina standard fiduciary powers, the Act
applies. Or he may draft specific instructions to the fiduciary re-
garding certain allocations. Both alternatives lack the flexibility
necessary for fairness and the second presumes a foresightedness
the settlor or testator likely does not and cannot possess. In most
cases the best alternative is broad fiduciary discretion.
In drafting for fiduciary discretion,7 6 careful attention to the
expression of the settlor's or testator's intentions, especially prefer-
ence for income or remainder beneficiaries, is important. Corporate
fiduciaries will prefer and perhaps request specific expressions of
such intent or other forms of guidance. Until North Carolina law in
this area develops further, the discretion should be made absolute,
not subject to review or question by anyone, and the operative lan-
guage should be clear and unequivocal. 76 The fiduciary's authority
should cover specifically and separately allocation of receipts and
expenses attributable to property which is subject to special treat-
ment by the Act, particularly those sections discussed in this Arti-
cle; a simple broad grant of discretion might be subject to ques-
tion. The draftsman should include broad exculpatory language
absolving the fiduciary from any liability. And the fiduciary should
probably be given discretion to make equitable adjustments. Broad
fiduciary discretion to allocate between principal and income will
allow for accommodation of changing economic conditions and
changing circumstances of beneficiaries and the nature of trust in-
275. See generally, Browning, Problems of Fiduciary Accounting, 36 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 931, 956 (1961); Wormser, The Exercise of Discretion, 100 TR. & EST. 777
(1961).
276. No beneficiary may have such discretionary power. See text accompany-
ing note 74, supra. There may be other problems, e.g., vaulation for gift tax pur-
poses. See text accompanying note 59, supra. And see text accompanying note 66,
supra, regarding grantor trust rules. There are a number of areas which could be
cause for concern which are not discussed in this article, such as estates and
trusts with charitable beneficiaries.
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vestments. Fiduciary discretion will not solve all problems of estate
and trust administration in this area but it should at least avoid
the potential unfairness in the application of those sections of the
Act discussed in this article.
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